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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
For the Eighth Circuit 
February 23, 1988 
All Chief Circuit Judges 
cc: Judge Gerald Heaney 
DONALD P. LAY, C~ief Judge. 
Federal Habeas Corpus 
FEB 2 5 1988 
It is my understanding that the Federal-State Jurisdictional 
Committee is supporting HR-1333, which would substantially affect 
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. _you will recall that 
in 1983 we had a thorough discussion of this legislation at the 
Judicial Conference. The overwhelming majority of the comments 
expressed at that meeting disapproved most of the proposed 
legislation. At that time the Committee on Court Administration 
had recommended that the Conference supper t these bills. Based 
on the negative reaction of most everyone present, Judge Hunter 
asked that the bi 11 be tabled and sent back to cornmi t tee. The 
Federal-State Jurisdictional Committee now acknowledges the 
"inaction" of the Judicial Conference in 1983 and has stated that 
it has reexamined the material and urges the Judicial Conference 
to reconsider it. 
I have obtained from the American Bar Association the 
letters written to the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. 
Senate, the report of the American Bar Association to the House 
of Delegates, and the statement made before the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate on S-238 on October 8, 1985. The 
American Bar Association has indicated that the House and Senate 
bills are an overreaction to perceived problems in the current 
habeas corpus procedures. 
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You all have enough to study in preparation for the 
Conference, and I will not write a detailed analysis of these 
materials. I invite your study of these reports and hope that 
you would share this information with your district court 
delegate. 
The statement by the Federal-State Jurisdictional Committee 
indicates that there were ·· over 32,000 petitions for state and 
f ederal prisoners filed in the federal courts in 1986. I wish to 
point out, however, that the vast majority of these cases, at 
least those filed by state prisoners, are§ 1983 actions and not 
habeas corpus petitions. Although I have not verified these 
figures, there are approximately 9,000 state prisoner petitions 
for habeas corpus pending in the federal courts. 
I think the most devastating portion of the proposed habeas 
corpus legislation is the attempt to legislate Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465 (1976), across the board by precluding federal 
habeas review in any case where there has been a "full and fair 
hearing" in the state court. The definition of a full and fair 
hearing is multiple and aside from the subs tantive effect of such 
legislation would provide federal courts an additional procedural 
obstacle course that would af feet almost every habeas petition 
filed. I think the attempt to provide preclusive effect under 
the full and fair hearing rule is a reach back to the rule that 
existed in 1915 under Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). It 
is an attempt in reality to eliminate federal review of 
prisoners' constitutional claims. In Jackson v. Virginia, 433 
U.S. 307 (1979), Justice Stewart pointed out the difference 
between the rule applicable in Fourth Amendment cases set forth 
in Stone v. Powell, and the rule that should pertain to other 
constitutional rights. He wrote: 
The respondents have argued nonetheless that whenever a 
person convicted in a state court has been given a 
"full and fair hearing" in the state system--meaning in 
l. 
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this instance state appellate review of the sufficiency 
of the evidence--further federal inquiry--apart from 
the possibility of discretionary review by this Court--
should be foreclosed. This argument would prove far 
too much. A judgment by a state appellate court 
rejecting a challenge to evidentiary sufficiency is of 
course entitled to deference by the federal courts, as 
is any judgment affirming a criminal conviction. But 
Congress in §2254 has selected the federal district 
courts as precisely the forums that are responsible for 
determining whether state convictions have been secured 
in accord with federa~ constitutional law. The federal 
habeas corpus statute presumes the norm of a fair trial 
in the state court and adequate state postconviction 
remedies to redress possible error. See 28 U.S. C. 
§§2254(b),(d). What it does not presume is that these 
state proceedings will always be without error in the 
constitutional sense. The duty of a federal habeas 
corpus court to appraise a claim that constitutional 
error did occur--reflecting as it does the belief that 
the "finality" of a deprivation of liberty through the 
invocation of the criminal sanction is simply not to be 
achieved at the expense of a constitutional right--is 
not one that can be so lightly abjured. 
The constitutional issue presented in this case is 
far different from the kind of issue that was the 
subject of the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 
supra. The question whether a defendant has been 
convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the 
basic question of guilt or innocence. The 
constitutional necessity of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not confined to those defendants who are 
morally blameless. E.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S., 
at 697-698 (requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not "limit[ed] to those facts which, if not 
proved, would wholly exonerate" the accused). Under 
our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled 
to complain that he has been unconstitutionally 
convicted and imprisoned as a burglar. 
I suggest another deficiency of the proposed legislation is 
the attempt to define "cause" and "prejudice" under the 
Wainwright test. I think this would present additional 
procedural obstacles to the federal courts in passing upon these 
petitions. I also think the attempt to place a one year statute 
of limitation on habeas corpus cases is too restrictive. I think 
the ABA makes a good analysis of the objection to this rule and I 
cannot improve upon it. 
.. 
. Pa,ge 4 February 23, 1988 
In any event, I hope that you and the district court 
representative will give thorough study to the ABA report. I 




Adopted August 1982 
AMERICPN BAR ASSCX:IATIOO 
REroRI' 'ID 'llIE . 
HaJSE OF CEI.EG\.'IES 
REXXM1ENDATICN 
The Section of Criminal Justice rea:mre.rrls adq,tion of the 
foll<Ming resolutions: 
I. BE IT IeSOLVED, '111at the Arrerican Bar Associatioo OI;P)Ses habeas 
rorpus "reform" legislation. such as S. 653,* Title VII of H.R. 4898, 
and S. 2216 of the 97th Ccngress; and 
II. BE IT FURlliER RESOLVED, 'Ihat the Anerican Bar Association sup-
JX)rtsacbption of proarlures in state and federal courts to expedite 
appropriately the legal steps whim nrust be pursued between entry 
of the judgrrent of conviction by the state court and resolution 
of the federal habeas aJrpus proceeding, inclu:1ing: 
{a) expediting the direct state appellate prcx:ESs, 
inclu:1ing prarpt prepara lien of transcript arrl 
oourt scheduling orders for the filing of briefs 
by the attorneys; 
(b) expediting any state ros t-cx:nvicticn rerredy neres-
sary for exhaustion of state reredies tmder Picard 
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 {1971); 
(c) if appropriate ~r state rules and statutes, use 
of a unified review process in which the direct ~ 
peal is held in abeyance while issoos not adequately 
""Ibis rejecticn was 'VOted by the Criminal Justice Section at its May 



























































raised by the reoord belON are examined. The M:> 
proa:!edi.ngs \o.Quld be o::::nsolidated if the interven-
ing oollateral proceeding we.re tm.successful; 
(d) prc:npt sthmi.ssion by the state to the federal court 
considering a petiti01 for habeas oorpus of all 
state oourt docurrents or o::pies of them, incluling 
the transcript of trial (whim should have been 
prepared for the state app:!llate procedures) aro. 
the briefs filed ... by the parties in the state ap-
pellate courts; 
(e) strict ti.rce ra:JUirerrents for the filing of rraroranda 
in the federal habeas oorpus proceeding; 
( f) prc:npt disp::>Si tic:n by the habeas oorpus oourt of the 
peti ti01 for habeas oorpus relief; and 
III. BE rr FURIHER RESOLVED, That the Arrerican Bar Association 
sUfPC)rts the prc:npt availability of cx:npetent cotm.sel for both 
state and federal oourt proceedings, essential in many instances 
to enable the federal oourts fairly and expeditiously to evaluate 
the rreri ts of a claim presented in a habeas oorpus petition, 
incltrling: 
(a) Prc:npt apfOintrrent of cxnpetent ootm.sel to pursue 
state ai;pellate p~s, state J:X)St-oonviction rerredies, 
or unified review prcx::ess; 
(b) ApJ::ointrrent of rounsel other than trial rotmSel 
should any question of trial rounsel' s cx:npetence 
be an issue; 
(c) Cotmsel in the state appellate process, post-convicti01 
review process, or unified review procedure should be 
trained to present in the stare rourts the facts aro. 
legal preredents which fonn the basic federal 
oonstitutional issues raised by the cause; 
(d) Counsel should be made available at prisc:ns to permit 
oonference with potential petitioners to detenn.i.ne 
whether federal constitutional issues are presented 
by their cases and, where sum issues exist, to prepare 
habeas oorpus petitions; 
(e) Absent earlier availability of rounsel, the federal 






Justice Act to prepare cx:nplete, factually and legally 
cbcurented habeas ex>rpus petitions, or to arcend petitions 
filed pro ee. Counsel should be assi~d if any norr 
frivolous <XlflStituticnal issue is presentoo and tmless it 









(f) carpensation of cx:mnsel for the representation of habeas 6 3 
(X)rpus peti ticners should be made at a fair rate of 6 4 
payrrent; : 6 5 
(g) A system of rronitoring both assigned and retained (X)unsel 66 
to assure cx:::npetency of perfonciance should be instituted; and 6 7 
N. BE rr FURI'HER RESOLVED, That the Arreri.can Bar Associatic:n SUR)Orts 6 8 
establishrrent of a high standard for cx:npetence of cnunsel for the 6 9 
defendant or peti tic:ner that is unifoDn for all proceedings in all 7 O 
jurisdictions: 71 
(a) '!he standard should aCCX)rd with ABA STANDARI:6 FOR CRIMINAL 7 2 
JUSTICE, 'IHE DEFENSE FlNCTICN, Standard 4-1. 1 ( 2d ed. 19 80) ; 7 3 
(b) '!he standard should require the exercise of skill arrl 7 4 
kna,.,rledge expected of an attorney experienced in the 75 
practice of criminal and cx:::nstituticnal law; 76 
(c) Assuning the presentatic:n by counsel who has perfonred 7 7 
in accxn:d with the standard of cx:npetence set out aoove, 7 8 
the federal habeas (X)rpUS ex>urt should examine s1.10JeSsive 7 9 
petitions in aCXX)rd with Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 8 0 
1 (1963) , which has been pranu.lgated as 28 U.S.C. §2244 and 81 
Rule 9 {b) of the Rules for §2254 peti tic:ns unless a 8 2 
petitioner cx:::rres within an exception to the rule; 8 3 
(d) Asst.ming the presentation by (X)unsel who has perfomed in 8 4 
aC(X)rd with the standard of cx:npetence, the habeas ex>rpus 8 5 
oourt should apply the standard against delayed filing 8 6 
under Rule 9 (a) of the Rules for S2254 petitions tmless 8 7 
the petitioner cx:::rres within an exceptic:n to the rule; 8 8 
(e) A failure to rreet the standard articulated herein for 8 9 
rreasuring a::npetence of cx:nmsel should be treated by the 90 
oourts as inadequate representation under the Sixth 91 
Arrendrrent arrl "cause" excusing a failure to raise a 92 




Proposed legislation is now pending before Congress to 
limit state prisoner access to the federal courts by means of 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Such writs may challenge 
solely on federal constitutional grounds the validity of the 
judgment of conviction. Some proposals also limit access by 
federal prisoners who seek to attack their federal convictions 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255, the statutory substitute for 
habeas corpus. The legislation is an outgrowth of a variety 
of philosophical and factual arguments used to justify restric-
tions on access to the federal courts. This report examines 
the reasons given to justify limitation of access, the pro-
, posed legislation, and finally, our recommendations and the 
reasons they are a more satisfactory method for resolving the 
valid concerns involving habeas corpus.* 
I. RESPONSES TO THE RATIONALE FOR LIMITING ACCESS 
TO THE FEDERAL COURTS ON HABEAS CORPUS 
The current emphasis on limiting access to the federal 
courts through habeas corpus by persons convicted of state 
crimes rests on several philisophical grounds concerning the 
relationship between an individual and the Government and be-
tween the States and the federal government.** They are ex-
pressed as comity, finality, and federalism. Although these 
concepts are related, they c~n be separately defined. 
"Comity" allows the state courts the first opportunity 
to examine the constitutionality of their own proceedings: 
federal examination may occur only if the state has had an 
initial opportunity to determine the issue. This is accom-
plished by exhaustion of state remedies. Should the state 
*A Table of 0::mtents to the sections of this Report follows as an 
attadm~nt. ·· 
~s debate is not new. See Shapiro, Federal _Habeas Corpus: A Study 
in Massachusetts, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 322-324 and footnotes (1973~ Yackle, 
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES (Lawyers Co-op 1981), and articles cited; Symposiwn, 














court actually examine a federal constitutional issue, defer-
ence is given to the factual determinations made by the state 
court in determining the constitutional claim. Should the 
state court decline to examine the constitutional issue be-
cause there has been by-pass or failure to employ valid state 
procedures to present the issue, federal examination is lim-
ited. Comity competes with the interest of the individual in 
having errors of constitutional magnitude in the criminal pro-
ceeding corrected. . . 
"Finality," in this context, denotes the conclusion of 
litigation relating to a conviction that results in punish-
ment. It is presumed by those favoring restriction of fed-
eral habeas corpus availability that only when all litigation 
concerning a conviction is concluded will the prisoner suffer 
his punishment and appreciate that he has violated the rules 
of society . and commence efforts at rehabilitation. Proponents 
also urge that finality avoids a retrial and the possibility 
that the accused will not again be convicted because of the 
loss of prosecution evidence. Finally, it is maintained that 
public confidence in the criminal justice system will be re-
stored and maintained by making state convictions final. As 
with comity, the competing consideration is regard for each 
individual's constitutional rights and the provision of a pro-
cedure for correcting violations of those rights. 
"Federalism" is the concept that federal courts should 
be barred altogether from ruling on federal constitutional 
claims. In such a system, federal constitutional claims 
would be resolved by the state courts. 
Pragmatic arguments are made for restricting access to 
the federal courts. Such arguments are used to support philo-
sophical ones, but they are also subject to independent analy-
sis to test their validity. Among such claims are that habeas 
corpus litigation claims too great a share of available fed-
eral judicial time and resources, · that the prisoner delays 
filing his petition until witnesses against him are lost so 
that the state is prejudiced in a retrial which may be unsuc-
cessful, that federal courts show a lack of respect for state 
court decisions by holding frequent hearings and overruling 
state court judges, and that a single federal judge may over-




A. Puniahment ia generally not delayed by ths 
filing of petitiona for writs of habeas 
corpus. 
The idea that collateral proceedings inhibit swift and 
certain punishment for those persons convicted of crimes is 
not an accurate one. With rare exceptions, the state collat-
eral proceedings necessary to exhaust state remedies* and 
federal habeas corpus petitions are brought by prisoners who 
are actually serving their terms of imprisonment and who are 
subject to the rigors and' limitations of the prison environ-
ment.-lt-k Indeed, one recurring problem with prose prisoner 
petitions is that they do not make a clear presentation of 
the issues and fail to cite appropriate legal authority be-
cause of the limited skill of the writer and his limited ac-
cess to legal materials and legal assi~tance in prison.-ktt 
Although prisoners who have been sentenced to death are 
in custody, the ultimate penalty is obviously postponed pend-
ing completion of the habeas corpus proceeding. Much support 
for limiting access to the federal courts comes from those who 
are concerned about postponement of che execution of state-
authorized death penalties during the habeas corpus procedure. 
*Before a constitutional challenge to a state conviction may be brought 
on federal habeas corpus , the petitioner n:ust present his claim to the 
state courts. 1his can be done in the direct appellate process or through 
an independent proceeding cal led 'p:>s t-conviction rerredy .'' · 
\.mether an issue is properly raised on a direct appeal or by a post-
conviction remedy is determined by the status of the record. In rrost juris-
dictions, if the factual issue is explored on the record of the trial, the 
appeal is the appropriate form in which to present the issue. If, however, 
additional factual inforniation is -required, a post-conviction rerredy is 
used. Usually the post-conviction remedy is unavailable if the issue was, 
or could have been, presented on appeal. 'The post-conviction remedy is 
l abeled either habeas corpus, in the nature of coram nobis, or by the mm-
ber of the statutory section that authorizes the procedure (e.g., in New York, 
a §440.10 notion (N.Y.C.P.L. §440.10). See Yackle, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, 
supn:- • at Cli. l (hereinafter cited as "Yackle"). · 
*See Robinson, AA EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF 
STATE COURT JUDGMENTS 9 (Dept. of Justice 1979) (hereinafter, "Robinson"). 
-,1.-H:Canpare i>,irerican Bar Association, STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
POST-CoNVICTION REMEDIES, Standard 22-3.1 (2d ed. 1980). 
6 




Proponents of limited access to the federal courts view such 
postponements as federal intervention into the state's deci-
sion to employ the death penalty. However, the only issue 
relevant to the habeas corpus discussion is whether there are 
unnecessary delays in the habeas corpus process. Questions 
of whether or not the death penalty is properly used are not 
appropriately considered here. Accordingly, the recommenda-
tions of this report to avoid unnecessary delays, rather than 
preclusion of federal court examination of federal constitu-
tional issues, are the appropriate responses to criticism of 
the habeas corpus process,. 
B. There is no rational _aonnection between 
custodial _rehabilitation and the filing 
of petitions for· writs of habeas corpus. 
Advocates of limitations on habeas corpus have argued 
that preparation and the pendency of habeas corpus petitions 
adversely affect rehabilitation of the prisoner. Whether or 
not prisoners are generally distracted from rehabilitation at 
prison during the preparation or pendency of habeas corpus 
petitions is a matter for speculation. No study or statistic 
provides any basis for arguing that there is a cause and ef-
fect relationship between the two; at present, such a conclu-
sion is pure surmise. · 
112D 
However, the information available about custodial re-
habilitation makes clear that rehabilitation is so far from 
being a realistic possibility in prisons in the United States 
that prisoner rehabilitation is an irrelevant facto~ in deter-
mining whether to curb efforts to vindicate constitutional 
rights. 
Judicial precedents make clear that basic living condi-
tions in most American prisons are so inhumane and so incon-
sistent with constitutional standards prohibiting cruel and 
unusual punishment that they are the antithesis of a rehabil-
itative environment. Prison conditions are described in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in United States v . . 
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,419 (1980), and concern about such con-
ditions is joined by other members of the Court (444 U.S. at 
418). Justice Blackmun wi;ote: 
The atrocities and inhuman conditions of 
prison life in America are almost unbeliev-
able; surely they are nothing less than 
shocking .•.. A youthful inmate can expect 
to be subjected to homosexual gang rape 
his first night in jail. ... Weaker inmates 
7 
112D 
become the property of stronger prisoners 
or gangs, who sell the sexual services of 
the. victim. Prison officials either are 
disinterested in stopping abuse of prison-
ers by other prisoners or are incapable 
of doing so given the limited resources 
society allocates to the prison system. 
Prison officials often are merely indif-
erent to serious health and safety needs 
of prisoners &swell. Even more appalling 
is the fact that guards frequently parti-
cipate in the brutalization of inmates. 
There can be no little question that our 
prisons are badly overcrowded and under-
staffed and that this in large point is 
the cause of many of the shortcomings of 
our penal ·system. This, however, does not 
excuse the failure to provide a place of 
confinement that meets minimal standards 
of safety and decency. 
444 U.S. at 420-424. 
The inadequacy of the prison institutions is reflected 
in the court orders finding conditions of confinement uncon-
stitutional in 24 states,* Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
and the District of Columbia. Rhodes v. Chapman, 49 U.S.L.W. 
4677, 4681 n.l (S.Ct. June 15, 1981) . (BRENNAN,~, dissentingi 
For example, a recent decision holding the maximum security 
unit at the Colorado State Penitentiary unfit for human habi-
tation describes the conditions: 
Aside from the deficiency in cell size, 
.the buildings where inmates live are in 
a serious state of disrepair and fail to 
meet minimal health and safety needs of 
the prisoners. For example, the roofs 
in the major cellhouses and the prison 
auditorium leak despite repair work .... 
Existing heating and ventilation systems 
are incapable of providing adequate tem-
perature control and ventilation ... ( and,] 
especially in the cells and shower areas, 
*Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, low~, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary land, Mississippi, Missouri, 
New Harrpshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Mahana, Oregon, Permsyl-









results in excessive odors, heat and humid-
ity with the effect of creating stagnant 
air as well as excessive mold and fungus 
growth •.. facilitating per~onal discomfort 
as w~ll as health and sanitation problems. 
..• [There is] an extensive problem with 
rodent and insect infestation ...• Bath 
water in the shower areas remains impounded 
on the floors due to obstructed drains .... 
Metal strips sticking up through the floor 
along with expos~d electrical wiring pro-
vide additional health hazards to inmates 
using the shower facilities .... [Bedding] 
is heavily stained and soiled and is not 
cleaned or changed when a new inmate is 
assigned to a cell. 
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F. 2d 559, 
569-570 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. 
·denied, 101 S.Ct. 1759 (1981). 
llzb 
The court described the kitchen: water covering the floor, 
drains non-functional, rotting food on the floors, infesta-
tion with rodents and insects, floors covered with dirt and 
rodent droppings, food stored with mold (639 F.2d -at 571,572). 
The opinion also explained conditions of personal safety: 
The violence and fear which permeated 
the prison population ... in past years 
continues to exist. The efforts of many 
inmates are directed at merely staying 
alive while they serve their sentences. 
... Prison records for 1978 and part of 
1979 show a significant number of stab-
bings, assaults, fights, and threats. 
In testimony before the Senate, prisoners similarly de-
scribed conditions of physical safety at the Federal Peniten-
tiary at Atlanta. Testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate, 96th Cong., 2d Ses s. (Aug. -Oct. 1978 ). 
The conditions of confinement that precipitated the 
Attica riots in New York State are described in ATTICA: 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION 




In circumstances like these, which prevail in many United 
States prisons, the denial of prisoner access to the federal 
9 
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courts because rehabilitation might be inhibited is ludicrous. 
Indeed. recent studies of sentencing. particularly of use of 
the indeterminate sentence (the goal of which is rehabilita-
tion), have led experts to question whether the indeterminate 
sentence is justifiable in view of the general failure of the 
rehabilitative goal of custody: 
Thus. while we pour increasing numbers 
of people into prisons for the serving 
of uncertain sentences. the most basic 
of asserted ju~rtifications • the program 
of rehabilitation, is absent. In a host 
of cases, then, when somebody says a 
prisoner must be locked up because he is 
not "ready" for release, the ultimate 
Kafkaism is the lack of any definition 
of "ready." Facing the facts. we know 
that "treatment" is mostly an illusion 
in our prisons. There is powerful evi-
dence that the majority of prisoners 
deteriorate- become poorer risks and 
lesser people- rather than improve in 
prison .... 
Frankel. CRIMINAL SENTENCES: 
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 9 3 (197 3 ). 
Indeed, because the rehabilitation goal is not considered 
to be a predictable result of custody. the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives has adopted the 
position that rehabilitation should not be a purpose of a cus-
todial sentence, but rather that custody should be used to 
provide the opportunity for training and assistance. Report 
on Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980 of the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Rep. No. 96-1396, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4 36 ( 1980 ). The report is based on 
studies of custody and rehabilitation. Morris, THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 12-22 (U. of Chicago Press 197 5 ). 
Aside from prison conditions. whatever litigation may be 
the subject of the prisoner's attention, he or she must still 
be at least overtly participating in whatever prgrams exist in 
the institution of confinement in order to earn credits for 
"good time," parole. furloughs, or work release. Conversely, 
the prisoner seeks to avoid administrative detention, segre-
gation ("the hole"), and_ loss of good time privileges such as 
family visits by obeying prison rules. These realistic con-
cerns of one in custody generate at least the appearance of 









the system captures the mind of the man is not capable of 
general determination and should not be a factor in deciding 
whether he will be permitted to seek ~indication of his con-
stitutional rights. 
I I 2D 
Finally, even assuming that rehabilitation is a realistic 
possibility, there is authority for the belief that the oppor-
tunity for a prisoner to express grieva~ces in a formalized, 
structured manner before a neutral forum independent of his 
custodian is not only an important factor in the rehabili-
tative process; but an instrumental one in promoting prison 
discipline. Robinson at 4. The Supreme Court said, in Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,831 (1977~ 
•.• Independent legal advisors can mediate 
or resolve administratively many prisoner 
complaints that would otherwise burden the 
courts, and can convince inmates that other 
grievances against the prison or the legal 
system are ill-founded, thereby facilitat-
ing rehabilitation by assuring the inmate 
that he has not been treated unfairly. 
In Bounds, the Court noted the expert opinions, including the 
Amer i can Correctional Association and the National Sheriffs 
Association, favoring, as an aid to rehabilitation, prisoner 
access to the courts for resolution of legal questions. 430 
U.S. at 829 n.18. Particularly enlightening is the report of 
a study of prison treatment by prison directors · (Candarelli 
& Finkelstein, Correctional Administrators Assess the Adequacy 
and Impact of Prison Legal Services Programs in the United 
States , 65 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 91, 98-99 
(1974» which shows that the availability of prison legal ser-
vices and the opportunity for prisoners to litigate "removes 
f estering doubts in many cases and may help set a man's sights 
on r e h abilitation rather than revenge." 
C. Difficulties in retrial are reduced. 
The belief that it would be difficult io retry and obtain 
a conviction in a case in which a writ of habeas corpus is 
gra nted does not warrant the concern given to it. First, it 
must be understood that only a few writs are granted each year 
(s e e infra). Second, the delays between the initial trial and 
a retrial, which advocates of limitation assert result in the 
loss of evidence, are not generally caused by the petitioner 
( s e e infra). Indeed, delays are the result of the time required 
11 
·.112D 
to complete the state appellate proceedings or collateral pro-
ceedings. or by the state's own appeal of an order granting 
the writ or its opposition to the petitioner's appeal if the 
writ is denied even in those cases in which error should be 
conceded and the matter returned to the state courts for re-
trial. 
Third, transcription of the minutes of the tria l and the 
preservation of testimonx on audio and videotape, if not yet 
regularized in all jurisdictions , are becoming normal prac-
tices in many courts. These methods of record-keeping as well 
as carefully formulated rules of evidence for the conditional 
admission of these kinds of records as evidence may prevent 
prejudice to the state should its witnesses or their memories 
become unavailable for use at a second trial. See, e.g •• Fed. 
R.Ev. 804(aX3) and(4i 
D. The extent of federal involvement in state 
criminal casea is minimal. 
In 1980, 4.5 million criminal cases were disposed of by 
courts of general and limited jurisdiction.* 





















In fiscal year 1981, 7,790 habeas corpus petitions were 
filed by state prisoners in the federal courts. Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR, Table 21 at 63 (1981) (hereinafter, "1981 Report" );A" This 
figure is compared to a total civil case filing in the federal 
uis~rict courts of 180,576 cases (1981 Report, Table 20 at 63). 
?.fubeas corpus filings since 1970 are as 
1970 - 9,063 
follows: 
1976 - 7,833 
1977 - 6,866 
1978 - 7,033 
1979 - 7 ,U3 
1980 - 7,031 
1971 - 8,372 
1972 - 7,949 
1973 - 7,784 
1974 - 7,626 
1975 - 7,843 
1981 Report, Table 21 at 63; 
1975 Report, Table 24. 
The increase noted in prisoner filings in the narrative part of the 
1981 Report is due to the increase in civil rights filings, which fran 
__ .,_ -• .: .Ll<..>.1. 111Creased by 155.2Z. In that period, habeas corpus filings 
decreased by . 7Z. Civil rights actions are not permissible proceedings 
in which to challenge an tmderlying conviction. Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475 (1973). 
By Circuit, the filings of petitions for wr:its of habeas corpus in 
fiscal year 1981 ,;,.,ere: 
First Circuit - 125 Sixth Circuit -- 860 
Second Circuit - 663 Sevent.'1 Circuit - 658 
Third Circuit - 484 Eighth Circuit - 373 
Fourth Circuit - 1,104 Ninth Circuit -- 851 
Fifth Circuit - 2,348 Tenth Circuit -- 300 
'lhe largest nurber of petitions "'1ere filed in the district courts of 




It is a revealing comparison, too, to note the number of 
habeas corpus petitions filed relative to the number of cases 
filed in federal courts during the same period based on diver-
sity of citizenship: approximately 60,000 diversity cases were 
filed.* 
Case dispositions in the federal courts also demonstrate 
that the number of habeas corpus cases is small. In fiscal 
year 1981, 177,925 civil cases were terminated in the federal 
courts (1981 Report, Table 36 at 85; Table CA at A-26). Of 
these, 100,810 were terminated with court action; 11,416 were 
completed during or after trial (1981 Report, Table CA at A-26). 
The number of terminated diversity cases was 39,368: 22,846 
involved court action, and 4,439 involved a trial (1981 Report, 
Table CA at A-27). Compare these figures to habeas corpus cases 
filed by state prisoners: 7,302 were terminated, 6,834 with 
court action-with only 165 hearings before district courts 
(1981 Report, Table CA at A-26) and 243 before United States 
magistrates (1981 Report, Table M-5 at A-154). The total dis-
trict court figure (165) includes not only evidentiary hear-
ings, but also legal proceedings in which only legal argument 
was presented by counsel.'J\-k 
Thus, habeas corpus matters constituted 1. 3! of all civil 
hearings conducted by federal district judies in 1981, and 
haarings were held in only 5.75% of the habeas corpus cases 
terminated. 
Further, according to the 1981 Report, habeas corpus hear-
ings occupied a comparatively minimal amount of district court 
time. The total number of cases tried, including petitions 
filed by federal prisoners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (to 
challenge sentence computation, parole board decisions, and 
conditions of confinement) was 204. · (This does not conflict 
wi~h ~he earlier cited number, 165, which represents only state 
prisoner petitionsJ Of thes~, 158 took one day to try, 26 took 
two days, 10 took three days, and 9 took from four to nine days. 
1981 Report, Table CA at A-40. The comparison in the same table 
to other civil cases demonstrates that an assertion that dis-
proportionate amounts of federal judicial time are spent on 
habeas corpus cases is without basis in fact. 
-tcntls figure is derived fran COOl)aring categories of diversity cases 
tenninated in 1981 Report Table ffi at A-27 with the sarre categories in-
cluded in 1981 Report Table 19. 
~s information cares fran the Administrative Office of the United 













Thus. it can · readily be seen that devotion of in-court 
judicial time to the constitutional claims raised by habeas 
corpus cases is comparatively insignificant. There are no 
statistics to demonstrate the amount -of out-of-court time 
spent on examining petitions; however, experience shows that 
two factors are significant to this time period: first the 
cooperation of state officials in supplying the state court 
record; and second, the appointment of counsel to represent 
the petitioner. Similarly, it is clear that hearings are not 
irrationally or improperly undertaken by federal judges. The 
available data show the same restrained consideration given 
to the granting of writs. :In 1971, the number of petitions 
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in which requested relief was denied was 96% (Shapiro, supra, 
87 Harv. L. Rev. at 333 ). It appears that this number remained 
approximately constant into 1977 (Robinson, supra, at 4(c». 
Available evidence also demonsrtates that the leading ground 
for dismissal of habeas corpus petitions is the petitioner's 
failure to exhaust state remedies and other procedural defects 
(Shapiro at 334; Robinson at 4(b), 13, 3ll This is a clear 
indication that federal judges give great care to protect the 
states' interests in determining habeas corpus issues. 
Although habeas corpus writs have had an impact on the 
federal courts, less investment of judicial time is required 
to process these petitions than to preside over traditional 
lawsuits (Robinson at 4(b». It does not appear that the cur-
rent caseload is disproportionately great on the federal 
courts, in either absolute terms or in light of other kinds 
of cases before those courts and the number of criminal cases 
processed in the states. Indeed, the number of habeas corpus 
cases is small and the amount of federal judicial time spent 
in disposing of them appears, from the data, to be minimal, 
while the constitutional issues determined in such cases are 
often of compelling significance. 
It should also be noted that, while the number of writs 
actually granted is small, the mere filing of a habeas corpus 
petition, especially if counsel is appointed, often produces 
a favorable result, even if that result is not court-ordered 
relief. When a state concedes that its custody of a prisoner 
is wrong or that some other error permitting relief has oc-
curred ( Shapiro at 338; Robinson at 24 ), the purpose of the 
writ is satisfied. Furthermore, the studies note that the 
appointment of counsel expedites the habeas corpus process 
and affirmatively assists in obtaining relief and eliminating 
procedural defects so as to avoid wasted judicial effort (Rob-




The importance of maintaining prisoner access to the fed-
eral courts for interpretation and application of the United 
States Constitution is just as critical - if not more so - than 
retaining access to the federal courts for diversity jurisdic-
tion cases involving only damage claims under state law. Pro-
posals to bar federal habeas corpus availability to state pri-
soners should be rejected. 
E. The inter~m for federal habeas corpus is not 
an unjustified delay caused by petitioners. 
Opponents of the habeas corpus proceeding have asserted 
that petitioners deliberately delay filing their federal peti-
tions so that, if the petition succeeds and a new trial is 
ordered in their case, the state will have lost its ability to 
conduct a retrial. There are no data to support this claim; 
indeed, there does not appear to be any evidence upon which it 
may be concluded that late filings are deliberate efforts by 
prisoners to sabotage further state proceedings against them. 
American Bar Association. STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Stan-
dard 22-2. 4 ( 2d. ed. 1980) (Commentary). The empirical data 
(Robinson at 42-43) that do exist show that, far from foster-
ing most of the delay, prisoners file their federal petitions 
as soon as they believe it is appropriate for them to do so. 
And this is the only rational approach for a prisoner to take 
- his primary concern is his prompt release from custody. 
Of course, the filing of the federal petition must be 
postponed until completion of the state appellate and post-
conviction proceedings necessary to satisfy the requirement 
of exhaustion of available state remedies. In one study, the 
mean length of time involved in pursuing direct appeals of 
criminal convictions in state courts varied from 10 to 31 
months . Washy, et al., VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE 
COURTS : PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES 29-32 (National Center for 
State Courts 1979).* In 1981, a study was published involving 
six appellate courts and 5,900 direct appeals filed in 1975 
and 1976. The average time from the lower court judgment to 
issuance of the appellate mandate was shown to be from 240 
days to 648 days. APPELLATE COURT DELAY 86 (National Center 
for State Courts 1981)~ Because many issues cannot be raised 
in the state courts in the direct appeal procedure, but must 
instead be presented in a post-conviction proceeding to expand 
-kJ.\..ienty-nine states ~re reviewed for a given length of tirre between 
1975 and 1977. 
~ actual tirre involved in the six appellate courts was 240, 330, 
332, 369, 378, 413, 431, 484, 641, and 648 days in both criminal and civil 















the record, the interim approximate time needed to complete an 
appeal and/or a post-conviction proceeding must accommodate this 
requirement.* The exhaustion require~ent may compound delay if 
the petition is procedurally defective and the case must be re-
turned to the state courts for that reason.tt See Robinson at 
17. 
Nonetheless, in the Robinson study, Table 15 at 42 and 43, 
it was found that petitions were filed in federal courts on an 
average of three years after.·conviction. In the six federal 
district courts studied, it was found that petitions were filed 
between 669 and 1,296 days after the conviction. Of course, 
some time is required for disposition of the matter before the 
federal district court and on the federal appeal, if one is 
taken. See Robinson, Table 15 at 43, and 42-46; Shapiro, Table 
III at 333; 1981 Report, Table CSB at A-32. 
Some petitions are filed outside this average range of 
time. There are often sound reasons for such delay, however, 
including not only the procedural requirements noted above, 
but the fact that such petitions are ~lmost always. filed by 
prisoners, and account must be taken of incompetency, possible 
illiteracy, ignorance of the law, inability to prepare adequate 
papers, lack of access to legal materials or state court records, 
and the control over filing exercised by state prison officials~ 
*In toose jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedures Act, the direct appeal may be held in abeyance until the col-
lateral attack is carrpleted and then, if necessary, the appeals are con-
solidated. In other jurisdictions, post-conviction r:elief nust await can-
pletion of the direct appellate process. 
-~r Wainwright v. Sykes, 443 U.S. 72 (1977), the federal court nust 
first detennine 'Whether there is an available state remedy and, if rot, whe-
ther there has been a prpcedural by-pass. 
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F. Judicial rsvieu of state court decisions by a 
single federal judge occurs only if the state 
does not appeal. 
The assertion has been made that a single federal judge 
may override the decisions of the collected state judiciary. 
While this is theoretically possible, it occurs only when a 
petition succeeds and the state takes no further action. Under 
the applicable statutes, a federal district judge's decision 
favoring a petitioner may~be appealed by a state as of right 
- that is, without the discretionary certificate of probable 
cause. Thus, a decision granting a writ is automatically re-
viewable by a three-judge panel of the appeals court if the 
state files and perfects an appeal. The cry of "foul" on 
this score is simply not justified. A state also has avail-
able to it the remedy of seeking en bane consideration of its 
position by the federal court of appeals and review by the 
United States Supreme Court. By contrast, appeal by a prison-
er is discretionary with the court. 
G. Comity interests are fully protected. 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court leave no doubt that 
the states' interests in ftrst determining the constitutional 
issues ~aised are fully protected. The same issue presented 
to the federal court must first have been argued to the state 
courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 Cl971~ The fact find-
ings of the state court, whether trial or appellate, are given 
deference under 28 U.S.C. §2254Cd). Sumner v. Mata, 49 U.S.L.W. 
4133 CS.Ct. Jan. 21, 1981~ If more than one claim is presented 
to the federal court, all of them must first have been raised 
in the state courts. Rose v. Lundy, 50 U.S.L.W. 4272 CS.Ct. 
March 3, 1982). By-pass of a state procedural rule is a bar to 
federal litigation. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 Cl977). 
Thus, state complaints about failure to respect comity in-
terests do not justify legislation or merit serious concern. 
H. "Federalism" does not justify preclusion of 
federal court examination of constitutional 
issues. 
The step beyond having the state courts make the primary 
determination of constitutional issues is to have the state 
courts make the only constitutional decision. It is this in-
terest that appears to have provided the doctrinal basis for 
S.2216, the bill sponsored by the Attorney General of the 
United States now before the Senate, which imposes the most 
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be noted that it was not the states which urged this federal 
withdrawal upon the Congress (see S.636), but the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States. The Accompanying Notes of the At-
torney General state that federal revfew after a state deci-
sion defies common sense and sound judicial policy, that fed-
eral review seldom produces a different result, that it is 
desirable to make state judges ''who do rise to the occasion" 
strong and independent, that the origin of federal review con-
firms its "arbitrary nature," and that the current statutes 
do not explicitly authorize federal examination of the issues 
(Attorney General's Notes at 33-35). 
None of these explanations would support a Congressional 
policy of preclusion of federal court review of constitutional 
issues. 
That writs of habeas corpus are granted in only few cases 
does not justify preventing federal examination of constitu-
tional issues. In the few cases in which writs are granted, a 
person has been held in custody in violation of his constitu-
tional rights; state courts had refused to correct a violation 
of those rights; and the wronged individual obtained relief 
only through the federal courts. Minimizing the importance of 
decisions granting writs of habeas corpus distorts the signi-
ficance of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the 
people they were intended to protect. 
From experience, the rights involved in habeas corpus cases 
in which writs were granted were substantial guarantees includ-
ing the right to counsel and the right to a fair and impartial 
jury. 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the right of fed-
eral examination is whether such examination connotes a negative 
impression of state judges. Historically, state judges and the 
court structures of which they are a part were not responsive to 
claims of constitutional violation. This circumstance is what 
produced the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391. Fay was written because many states had provided no 
means - or had supplied only defective ones - for the presenta-
tion and consideration in state courts of federal constitutional 
claims. The response of many states in the ensuing years was to 
enact statutes which provided post-conviction remedies to allow 
presentation of such claims. Now, almost all states have some 
form of post-conviction remedy via which claims that cannot be 
raised on direct appeal may be presented. 
However, the effectiveness and fairness of many of these 
statutes enabling a petitioner to make a prompt and effective 
19 
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presentation of his claim is not established, and even if theo-
retically clear, may not be so applied in specific cases. See, 
e.g., Wilkes, Postconviction Relief in Georgia: A Decade after 
the Habeas Corpus Act, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 249 (1978}. . Anderson, Post-
Conviction Ralisf in Tennessee, 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 605 (198li It 
should be a matter of concern that, as federal oversight of con-
stitutional decisions diminishes, so will the newly-developed 
state court attention to them. 
As for individual ~tate judges' responses to constitutional 
claims, it is probable that those responses vary depending on 
personal preferences or prejudices. However, state court judges 
are elected and appointed for a term of years. They are subject 
to the pressures of press, public opinion (rightly aroused or 
not), or the person or institution responsible for appointing or 
nominating them. In difficult cases there is sometimes at least 
the appearance of influence. Newborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). Federal judges. because of their life-
time tenure, are not so vulnerable to the community of pressures 
with which state judges must contend. 
While the Attorney General ' s Notes in support of S.2216 rely 
extensively on the 1963 article by Professor Bator, Finality in 
Criminal La~ and Federal Habeaa Corpua for State Prisoners, 76 
Harv. L. Rev. 441, note should also be taken of a later article 
written by Professor Bator, The State Courts and Federal Consti-
tutional Litigation, 22 William& MaryL. Rev. 605, 626 (1980). In 
this latter article, Professor Bator urges that, if a defendant 
is given a "full and fair opportunity" to have his case heard in 
the state courts, no federal habeas corpus examination is permis-
sible. But Professor Bator acknowledges that this formula does 
not reach the question of competence and sensitivity to consti-
tutional issues, and urges that we think about the long run: 
One can well understand the plea of civil 
rights plaintiffs' lawyers that they should 
be allowed access to the federal courts be-
cause that is where they will find juster 
justice. But the plea cannot in itself be 
decisive to those, legislators and judges, 
charged with the task of designing and im-
plementing a system of remedial and juris-
dictional rules. They must think of to-
morrow as well as today; they must resist 
an exclusive fixation on the irranediate case. 
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This suggestion creates grave doubts as to the level of 
constitutional protection that is likely without federal over-
signt. It is important to have a system that works; the point 
is this: .we.are already possessed of such a system, which also 
protects individual rights. Only some crying need, not yet . 
demonstrated by the advocates of federalism, should compel fed-
eral abandonment or protection of individual constitutional 
rights. 
Nor does re-examination.of a constitutional claim by a fed-
eral court at all defy common sense or sound judicial policy. To 
the contrary, it is consistent with the goals of constitutional 
protection and is anticipated by Article III of the Constitution. 
II. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
The matters now to be discussed are raised by proposals to 
amend 28 U.S.C. §2254, the federal habeas corpus remedy for 
state prisoners. Currently pending before the Senate (S.653 
and S.2216) and the House of Representatives (H.R. 4898, Title 
VII) are bills designed to restrict access to the federal courts 
for the purpose of challenging the validity of state and federal 
convictions. In summary, the proposed legislation contains the 
following provisions: 
1. Proposals in all the bills set out what will consti-
tute a procedural by-pass, i.e., a failure to follow 
state procedures for raising a federal constitutional 
issue in state courts so as to bar presentation of 
the issue in the federal courts. The bills also set 
forth what circumstances will excuse by-pass. 
2. Proposals in all the bills establish a statute of 
limitations within which a petition for the writ 
must be filed. Variations in the individual bills 
with respect to this aspect are discussed below. 
3. 
4. 
Proposals in all the bills set out limited procedural 
defects in state procedures which will entitle federal 
courts to relitigate and redetermine a "fact," and set 
out a restrictive standard for determining whether the 
state court's finding of a fact is erroneous. 
A proposal in S.2216 denies federal court consider-
ation and determination of questions of law and mixed 
questions of law and fact, virtually without exception. 
5. S.2216 proposes changes in the appeal procedure. 
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6. Proposals in H.R. 4898 and S.653 prohibit eviden-
tiary hearings before United States magistrates 
without consent of the parties. 
As is outlined above, the concerns to which the proposed 
legislation are directed do not withstand analysis. Conse-
quently, as a cure for the alleged problems, the proposals are 
unjustified. Further, examination of the proposals shows that 
they impose such severe.~estrictions on protection of consti-
tutional rights as to render them of dubious constitutional 
validity and in conflict with ABA Standards of Criminal Justice 
as well as common law principles. Finally, consideration of 
the existing statutory scheme shows that it creates an appro-
priate structure for habeas corpus litigation. 
A. Procedural by-pass, cause, and prejudice 
1. The courts sh:ruld be given the opportunity to develop 
the law of by-pass, cause, and prejudice, and ro 
legislation sh:ruld be enacted. 
All the proposals would bar federal court consideration 
of constitutional issues which have not been presented to the 
state courts in accordance with state procedures, and enumerate 
the circumstances which would excuse such procedural by-pass. 
Inspiration for the proposals came from Wa~nwright v. Sykes. 
433 U.S. 72 (1977i 
Under Wainwright v. Sykes, a constitutional issue not pre-
sented in the state courts in accord with a state's contempor-
aneous objection rule, and for that reason not considered by 
the state courts, is deemed forfeited. Federal courts are not 
permitted to examine the issue because the state courts have 
declined to do so based on a justifiable state ground. The 
theory is that the required adherence to a procedure - in Wain-
wright v . Sykes, the contemporaneous objection rule- would en-
able the state trial judge to correct an error while trial pro-
ceedings are still in progress. It is at this time that wit-
nesses' recollections are freshest . or that an objection might 
result in an immediate decision favorable to the defendant and 
conclude the case, or that it might force the prosecutor to re-
consider the viability of his case (Id., 433 U.S. at 88-89). The 
critical consideration is that the state's rule not be arbitrary 
or calculated to discourage the claim, but necessary to protect 
the state's interests in curing mistakes in a timely fashion as 
they arise. Under Sykes, a state rule of procedure must be help-
ful to the legitimate state purpose of enabling a state to pre-









••. Soclety's resources have been concen-
trated at that time and place in order to 
decide wihtin the limits of .human fallibil-
ity, the question of guilt -or innocence of 
one of its citizens. Any procedural rule 
which encourages the result that those pro-
ceedings be as free of error as possible is 
thoroughly desirable, and the contemporaneous 
objection rule surely falls within this 
classification. . . 
Id_., 433 U.S. at 90. 
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In Sykes, the Court stated that exceptions to the by-pass 
rule were to be premised upon the cause for the failure to raise 
the issue and the prejudice arising from the claimed constitu-
tional defect. Both "cause" and "prejudice" were left undefined, 
matters to be explored in future cases. · 
We recommend that no statute touching on matters of by-
pass be enacted. The Sykes decision is a substantial withdrawal 
from the prior controlling principle established in Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963), under which federal courts were barred from 
considering a constitutional issue by a petitioner's failure to 
raise it in a state forum when the issue was knowingly and vol-
untarily relinquished. Under the new test of Sykes, federal 
courts should be free to determine . whether a state procedural 
rule serves a valid purpose such as assisting in the correction 
of trial errors, or is merely an arbitrary method of inhibiting 
or preventing presentation of issues to the state courts. 
Furthermore, statutory definition of "cause" and "prejudice" 
is inappropriate. Because the Sykes standard is a new one, and 
because of the variety of factual circumstances presented in 
habeas corpus petitions, it is appropriate for courts to decide 
if a specific by-pass is justified by the circumstances of the 
case. An attempt to define "cause" and "prejudice" at this 
stage .may prevent relief in appropriate but unforeseen circum-
stances. The development of judicial precedent on these issues 
has already begun, and the Supreme Court has. itself spoken to 
the issue in Engle v. Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376 (S.Ct. April 6, 
1982), and in Unit e d Stat es v. Frady, 50 U.S.L.W. 4388 (S.Ct. 
April 6, 1982 ). 
2. The specific proposed legislation should rot be adopted. 
The language of Sykes requires adherence to a valid rule of 
procedure. However, the language of the proposed legislation 
goes beyond Sykes to require more than state procedures require. 
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S.653 and H.R. 4898 require that federal constitutional issues 
be raised at trial and on appeal or in a state collateral pro-
ceeding. Section 2 of S.2216 would bar federal court consider-
ation of a claim not raised "in state proceedings at the time 
or in the manner required by state rules of procedure." 
However, in some states an issue not objected to at trial 
may nonetheless be raised on appeal, or the failure to follow 
state rules of procedure may be excused and the issue considered 
by the state appellate courts. This opportunity may be author-
ized by statutes or decisidns (e.g., New York Criminal Procedure 
Law §470.15; People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965h People v. 
Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1969». If an issue is raised on appeal 
and a procedural default is implicitly or explicitly excused, 
no legitimate state interest is served by declining consider-
ation of the issue in the federal courts. Indeed, decisions of 
the Supreme Court make it clear that actual consideration by the 
state courts is not the standard for evaluating by-pass, but 
whether the state has been given an opportunity to decide the 
issue. Smith v. Digman, 434 U.S. 332 (1978},* Yackle, supra, 
§63 at 257. The proposed legislation would bar federal court 
consideration of a constitutional issue that was prop~rly be-
fore the state courts, and would deny federal review when the 
state itself has, as · a matter of policy, opted to make the is-
sue a reviewable one. 
Furthermore, the requirements of S.653 and H.R. 4898 pre-
clude federal presentation of claims which may not be presented 
at trial but which are nonetheless appropriate for direct ap-
pellate review because the claims appear on the trial record 
(and for the same reason, cannot be presented in a collateral 
proceeding in the state courcs'lHr~ Primary among such issues 
are trial counsel's incompetence or conflict of interest. Such 
questions will almost never be raised at trial; counsel himself 
will not raise them, and the trial judge is not likely to raise 
these issues sua sponte. At least in the conflict situation, 
a judge need not raise the issue unless he is aware of it. 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980i As a practical matter, 
the defendant is not likely to be sufficiently familiar with 
the law to raise the issue himself. Further, a claim of in-
competent counsel on the part of defendants is often barred by 
~ opportunity to consider the issue is provided by the presentation 
of the claim. Because many decisions are rendered by appellate courts with-
out written opinion, they do rot disclose whether an issue was specifically 
rejected because of procedural error. 

















state court judge~. who will not hear pro Be motions by a de-
fendant who has counsel or who will compel a defendant either 
to proceed with counsel the defendant believes to be incompe-
tent or to appear prose. Other issues which might be appro-
priate for consideration on direct appeal although not speci-
fically objected to at trial are judicial misconduct, failure 
1 l 21! 
of the prosecution to es~ablish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
or the defendant's insanity. 
The proposals also make no distinction between rights or 
strategies which counsel may surrender on behalf of a client 
and rights which the defendant himself must affirmatively waive. 
Thus for example, counsel or a jury may be waived only by the 
defe~dant, and thus should not come within the by-pass doctrine. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938t 
The proposals include definitions of "cause." S.653 and 
H.R. 4898 find justifiable cause for the failure to adhere to 
state procedures if: 
U) there has been a declaration of a new and retroactive 
right; 
(2) state court procedures precluded assertion of the 
right; 
(3) the prosecutorial authorities or a judicial officer 
suppressed evidence, thereby preventing the claim 
from being raised or disposed of; and 
(4) material and controlling facts upon which the claim 
is predicated were not known to the petitioner or 
his attorney and could not have been learned by rea-
sonable diligence. · 
Section 2 of · s.2216 enumerates three "causes" for failure to 
comply with state procedural rules: 
(1) the failure to raise the claim properly or to have it 
heard in state proceedings resulting from state action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States;* 
-kine Attorney General's Notes relating to this proposal state that the 
issue of "cause" should be concerned with whether the state provided an op-
portunity to present the federal claim consistent with federal law. It is 
unnecessary to enact this bill to include the stated principle because it 
is inherent in Sykes which, as noted, requires that state procedural rules 
be rational and reasonable. In fact, the proposal has rothing whatever to 
do with "cause," but rather relates to the initial question of whether there 
has been a valid state rule that has been by-passed. 
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(2) the federal right asserted was not recognized; and 
(3) the factual predicate of the claim could not reason-
ably have been discovered. 
Conspicuous for its omission from this list is counsel's fail-
ure to raise a specific constitutional challenge because of 
his ignorance of the law or fact or of the implications of the 
law or fact. Even S.2216's state action requirement does not 
authorize a claim of counsel's improper conduct as excusing 
by-pass because the Supreme Court has said that the conduct of 
counsel, whether retained or appointed, is not state action. 
Polk County v. Dodson, 50 U.S.L.W. 4077 CS.Ct. Dec. 14, 1981)~ 
Furthermore, the limitation of the test of counsel's con-
duct to a level of incompetence under the Sixth Amendment is 
inappropriate in the context of the realities of practice in 
criminal cases. The issue of counsel's competence under the 
Sixth Amendment is properly raised on direct appeal (based on 
factors in the trial record) or on collateral atatck · (based on 
factors outside the record). It is itself an issue considered 
on habeas corpus, and counsel's competence is evaluated by 
judging his performance throughout the trial. See United States 
v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 477 (2d Cir. 1980h United States v. Tho-
mann, 609 F.2d 560, 566-567 (1st Cir. 1979~ However, what is 
crucial to "cause" is counsel's performance with respect to 
the particular constitutional issue not properly presented, and 
this limited examination of counsel's comptence should be the 
relevant factor when "cause" is the question. To impose the 
identical test for determining both the adequacy of counsel's 
total performance when the ba3ic claim is incompetence, and 
"cause" when the basic claim is premised on some other consti-
tutional violation, reduces all the issues to the single issue 
of counsel's incompetence. Such a result makes no sense if 
there is a genuine concern for curing prejudicial violations 
of any constitutional right. 
*Although Cuyler v. Sull_i _van, 446 U. S. 335 (1980), explains that state 
action is incarceration based on a cOllViction in a case in which counsel 
was inconpetent, after Dodson it appears that it is the custody itself that 
is the state action. In addition, see following text discussion on incan-





In addition, it is clear that, under a strict forfeiture 
rule (which is imposed by Wainwright v. Sykes), the lawyer's 
ability becomes even more significant than it would be if the 
Fay v. Noia waiver standar_d were in effect. Because counsel's 
conduct is binding upon his client, counsel's responsibility 
cannot be limited to informing his client of rights, but must 
also include conduct that is well informed. Under Sykes, it 
is more crucial that counsel's conduct be based on knowiedge 
of law and facts than it would be if his actions were binding 
only if strategically made, as it was under Fay v. Noia. In 
large measure, trial rights are left to protection by counsel, 
and it is expected that the client will rely on his attorney's 
decisions. Wainwright v. Sykes, supr~, 443 U.S. at 93 (BURGER, 
Ch. J ., concurring). 
In these circumstances, counsel's decision with respect 
to particular issues should not be binding on his client if 
they are the result of ignorance or negligence. Attorneys 
have met with substantial criticism of their performance in 
court. Burger, .The Special _Skills of Advocacy, 42 Ford.L. Rev. 
227 (1973}, Kaufman, Continuing the Call for Courtroom Compe-
tence, 64 A.B.A.J. 1626 (1978~ It is both necessary and salu-
tary to consider counsel's treatment of the particular issue 
involved when "cause" is the question before the court. 
Objection to the other "causes" defined in the bills is 
premised primarily on their exclusivity. As such, the list of 
"causes" is inadequate. No list of reasons for "cause" can be 
exclusive; the potential for variation of facts and circum-
stances is unlimited. For example, "cause" should include sup-
pression of evidence by prosecutorial authorities, judicial 
officers, and any government or public official. · It should 
include inadvertent or negligent failure to disclose, as well 
as intentional suppression. It should encompass the defendant's 
mental state and language facility and should include his fail-
ure to comprehend the significance of factual events. "Cause" 
is the kind of subject traditionally left to the courts to 
adjudicate on a case-by-case basis, and such a position con-
tinues to be appropriate. 
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B. Statute of limitations 
S.2216 includes a one-yar statute of limitations, enumer-
ating specific triggering events. S.653 and H.R. 4898 include 
a three-year statute of limitations, also with triggering 
events. 
1. The ABA Standards oppose a statute of limitations. 
The American Bar A~sociation has previously opposed the 
imposition of a statute of limitations for collateral proceed-
ings. American Bar Association, STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, Standard 22-2.4 (2d ed. 1980). Stan-
dard 22-2.4 explains that such a bar is unsound, and the com-
mentary underscores the absence of data to support the notion, 
articulated by advocates of limitation, that collateral reme-
dies are abused by petitioners' intentional withholding of 
claims, and the Standard suggests that if such abuses exist, 
they can appropriately be dealt with on a case-by-case basis 
by permitting denial of relief in those cases in which a peti-
tioner deliberately or inexcusably withholds a request for 
relief until some event occurs that would prevent reprosecu-
tion of his case.* 
2. The statute of limitations is an unlawful suspension 
of the writ and is unconstitutional. · · 
Art. I, 19, Cl. 2 of the Constitution of the United States 
reads: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the 
public safety may require it." A statute of limitations con-
stitutes a legislative/executive direction barring the courts 
-A'Ihe argunent of deliberate withholding of claims by petitioners is 
illogical. A prisoner is interested in obtaining his release fran custody 
as quickly as possible, · and ~ld not delay filing to avoid retrial. In 
addition, it is alnost i.rrpossible for an inmate to learn when a piece of 
evidence against him is lost or a witness against him has died or is other-
wise unavailable. As noted, delays in filing are of ten the result of state 
exhaustion requirements, strongly advocated to protect the integrity of 
state process. Obviously, there is an inconsistency between exhaustion 
requirenents and reduced delay in filing. One appropriate response to un-
necessary delay is the expeditious handling of state appellate and post-
conviction proceedings. Also as noted, new rrethods of recording testirrony 




















from consideration of the constitutionality of custody after 
the limitation period has expired. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 
U.S. 236,238 (1963}, Johnson v. Eisent~ager, 339 U.S. 763 
1950) (BLACK, J., dissenting); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 
1, 11-12 (1963~ United States v. Heyman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952i 
As such, it is contrary to the Constitution.* 
An argument has been made that no constitutional problem 
exists because federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state 
prisoners is of statutory origin. This position appears to 
be premised upon the thoery that Congressional action which 
interprets provisions of the Constitution is outside the scope 
of the Constitution. However, once Congress elected to pro-
vide a habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners, the constitu-
tional provisions relating to habeas corpus apply and prevent 
time limitations on the remedy. 
3. 1he statute of limitations has previously been 
rejected by courts and the O:mgress. 
The Congress and the courts have previously rejected 
application of a statutory time bar to habeas corpus relief. 
The Supreme Court has declined to find time-barred a petition 
for a writ of habeas.corpus simply because of the number of 
years that have ensued since the conviction. See Uveges v. 
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 
134 (1951); Herman v. Cloudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1955). In Cloudy, 
the Court said that " ... petitioner [was not] barred from 
presenting his challenge to the conviction because eight 
years had passed before this action was commenced." Referring 
to Uvege s and Palmer, the Court said, "[t]he sound premise upon 
which these holdings rested is that men incarcerated in flag-
rant violation of their constitutional rights have a remedy." 
Id., 350 U.S. at 123. Finally, in Heflin v. United States, 358 
U.S. 415,420 (1959) (STEWART, JJ, it was noted that no statute 
of limitations barred habeas corpus. 
In 1976, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
proposed Rule 9(a) for habeas . corpus proceedings, which cailed 
not for a time bar but for a rebuttable presumption that a 
""The theory for prohibiting suspension of the writ is that illegal 
detention based on a valid claim of constitutional error is a continuing 
illegality and the detention itself is the inproper official conduct to 
be concluded by a final order of release issued pursuant to the writ. Be-
cause the official illegality is a contirnring one. no statute of limita-
tions can apply. just as a statute of limitations does not prevent prose-
cution of a contirn..ling crime. 
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state was prejudiced by the filing of a habeas corpus petition 
more than five years after conviction. Pursuant to this pro-
posed rule, the burden would have been on the petitioner to 
rebut the presumption of prejudice.* 
The House Committee on the Judiciary found the rebuttable 
presumption unacceptable, and adopted a more traditional ap-
proach requiring the state to plead prejudice and the petition-
er to respond that he was unaware of the grounds for his chal-
lenge prior to the circtimstances that prejudiced the state. A 
decision by the federal court to preclude consideration of the 
petition is discretionary, permitting the writ to issue if jus-
tice requires. (H.R. Rep. No. 94-1471 at 5 (Sept. 2, 1976), re-
printed at 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2478 (1976); see 
Davia v. Adult Parole Authority, 610 F.2d 410 (6.th Cir. 1979). 
The provision of Rule 9(a) is not a suspension, for the 
passage of time does not, by itself, permit a dismissal. Rather, 
dismissal is to be examined in light of the circumstances: pre-
judice to the state, the cause for the petitioner's delay, and 
the seriousness of the asserted error. Thus, the circumstances 
of a particular case may justify denial of the writ, but not 
its suspension or bar. 
It is argued that if the state cannot rebut the claim of 
a prisoner whose petition is filed long after the records of 
his case are destroyed, the writ is automatically granted. The 
argument is specious. A petitioner bears the burden of prov-
ing his claims, and the federal district court may reject the 
claims as incredible or insufficient to meet that burden. Lack 
of credibility may, of course, be premised upon the judge's be-
lief that the petitioner's claim is a recent fabrication .. 
4. The proposals should be rejected. 
S.2216 provides that a petition must be filed within one 
year after exhaustion of state remedies, after termination of 
unconstitutional state action that prevents filing, after re-
cognition of a federal right, or after the time the facts that 
form the basis of the claim were discovered by reasonable dili-
gence. S.653 and H.R. 4898 provide that a petition must be filed 
within three years from the date of a final state judgment, or 
-kJ:nfonrati.on ccnceming the Proposed Rule 9(a) cares fran the Advisory 
Comni.ttee Note to Rule 9(a). However, it is critical to realize that tl-e 
rx:>te does rx:>t relate to the Rule as it was finally prooulgated. 1he rule 
eventually adopted was substantially different fran the one proposed, but 







within three years from the time a determination is made that 
a retroactive right exists or facts are discovered. 
The proposal is not feasible after the decision in Rose 
v. Lundy. 50 U.S.L.W. 4272 . (S.Ct. March 3.1982). In Rose. the 
Court held that joining of exhausted and unexhausted claims · 
in a single petition requires dismissal of the petition and 
either its withdrawal until all claims are exhausted or the 
petition is amended to strike the unexhausted claims. · A min-
ority of the Court warned that a petitioner who adopted the 
latter strategy, necessitating the filing of two petitions, 
ran the risk of dismissal of the second as successive under 
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28 U.S.C. §2254. Rule 9(b) of the Rules for §2254 Proceedings, 
and Sanders v. -United States, 373 U.S. 1 · (1963). Thus, a peti-
tioner who had to present some of his claims to the state courts 
on direct appeal, and other claims on post-conviction remedies 
would complete exhaustion at widely disparate times. 
Because S.2216 would require presentation of each claim 
within a year of its exhaustion, a petitioner would be forced 
to file successive petitions. The result of such a scheme is 
obvious: if a petitioner waits until all his claims have been 
exhausted in the state courts, the proposed statute of limita-
tions would bar presentation of those issues first exhausted; 
if he files successive petitions as the issues in his case 
mature, his later-exhausted claims may be dismissed. 
S.653 and H.R. 4898 have their own problems. Whatever a 
state's definition of "finality," a collateral proceeding is 
not part of the criminal case and would not prevent finality 
status from accruing and the statute from running. Accordingly, 
if an issue must be presented in a state post-conviction pro-
ceeding, the time period for federal habeas corpus application 
may run before appropriate state remedies are exhausted. Too, 
the proposals do not consider that some jurisdictions may deem 
a conviction final prior to the direct appeal and that the 
time for filing a federal habeas corpus petition might run be-
fore completion of the direct appellate process in the state 
courts . 
In addition to these problems, any time limit, especially 
a fixed one without any tolling provisions, connotes a failure 
to appreciate the practical circumstances with which litigants 
in habeas corpus cases are involved. Virtually all such peti-
tioners are in prison. Many are illiterate, ignorant, and 
confused. Some are retarded, mentally ill, insane, or phys-
ic~lly incapacitated. Concepts of by-pass, forfeiture,_w~iver, 
31 
112D 
and exhaustion, as well as the underlying substantive claims 
are complicated ideas. For most petitioners, no lawyer or • 
legal program is available. Although states do provide coun-
sel for a direct intermediate appeal, counsel is not required 
for discretionary appeals or for state post-conviction proce-
dures. Thus, the prisoner must prepare his case on his own 
or with whatever haphazard assistance he may obtain from a 
jailhouse lawyer. Prison law libraries are often lacking the 
basic volumes necessarytfor minimal research, but even if law 
books are available, prisoner access to libraries is strictly 
controlled and limited by prison regulations. Legal documents 
and books are frequently taken from prisoners during searches 
of cells and "shakedowns" conducted in the name of prison 
security.* Often a prisoner's legal work is destroyed or 
stolen by other inmates. Finally, one of the most devastat-
ing effects of prison disturbances on all inmates, whether 
participants or not, is the wholesale destruction of personal 
property, including legal papers, by inmates and guards. 
Additional problems continually affect inmates' opportun-
ity to prepare legal papers for filing in the federal courts. 
State court records, essential to prepare legally sufficient 
papers, are frequently not forwarded by state courts and pro-
secutors. Mail to and from persons outside the institution, 
with information relevant to the legal proceedings, may be 
censored or confiscated, again in the interests of security. 
As noted earlier (see ante at 4-7t conditions in most 
American prisons are so outrageous and unsafe as to compel 
attention to conduct necessary for survival, without time to 
prepare petitions. Finally, many prisoners spend the first 
part of their sentences in temporary classification centers . 
Even after . designation, a prisoner may be moved at the discre-
tion of corrections officials from one institution to another. 
An inmate may be removed from his designated prison on a writ 
issued by a prosecutor for a valid reason or merely to harass . 
Some prisoners have served a major part of their sentences on 
prison buses, in transit between institutions. Some prisoners, 
for reasons valid or not, may be compelled to spend time in 
administrative detention or segregation, with limited access 
to legal materials. Factual information giving rise to the 
constitutional claim may be disclosed to the petitioner after 
the proposed time for filing has run. New facts may emerge 
from previously undisclosed state files or previously unavail-
able evidence-.- for example, defense counsel's undisclosed 
conflict of interests. 
%ne of these circumstances constitutes unconstitutional state action 
















In some instances petitions are not filed by district 
court clerks, but are returned to the prisoner because of 
procedural or formal defects · (Robinson, supra, at 13) or are 
accepted but not filed (Id. at 45) - situations which could 
result in failing to meet time deadlines. Suffice it to say 
that any statute of limitations in circumstances like these 
is intolerable and would constitute a denial of access to 
the courts. 
Particularly disturbi~g is the philosophy implicit in 
the statute of limitations·proposal that a prisoner may be 
retained in custody if a new decision is rendered holding 
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the statute under which he stands convicted to be substan-
tively unconstitutional but the prisoner fails to file a 
timely petition. For example, a statute may be held to vio-
late the First or the Fifth Amendment (see Leary v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 
633 (2d Cir. 1971». In such situations, the prisoner has com-
mitted no crime and. the state is unjustified in holding him 
in custody. Further, if, in a capital case, the procedure 
for imposing the death sentence is violative of constitutional 
provisions (Estelle v. Smith, 49 U.S.L.W. 4490 (S.Ct. May 
1981», the judgment should not be executed whatever the stat-
ute of limitations. 
In sum, a statute of . limitations is unconstitutional as 
a suspension of the writ and, because of the unique condition 
of this category of litigants, as a denial of access to the 
courts. It is also unconstitutional to the extent that it 
may require custody ·.o·f a person who has committed no crime. No 
evidence exists to demonstrate that delays in filing habeas 
corpus petitions are intentional or abusive of the process. 
In any event, in those cases where abuse or intent is clear, 
the matter may be resolved on an individual, case-by-case 
ba~is. The particular proposals before Congress highlight 
the difficulties of a statute of limitations. 
C. No federal examination after a full and fair 
state proceeding 
By far the most substantive change in habeas corpus is 
proposed by S.2216. Under §5 of that bill no habeas corpus 
petition may be granted with respect to any claim that has 
been fully and fairly adjudicated in state proceedings. The 
intent of the proposal is to preclude litigation via habeas 




The proposal utterly changes the law by barring federal 
review on the ground that the state procedure is fair, rather 
than denying relief after examination because the state courts' 
substantive decision was constitutionally correct. Adoption 
of the proposal without a simultaneous creation of some other 
method of federal examination leaves the constitutional valid-
ity of the proposal in doubt. Furthermore, the suggestion bars 
federal court examination of federal constitutional issues; as 
such, the proposal shoulq.be disapproved. 
1. 1be present law 
Title 28 U.S.C. §2254 is Congressional direction for fed-
eral court consideration of constitutional claims raised by 
state prisoners. The mandatory language of subsection (a) 
demonstrates that the federal court must consider the issue 
but that the writ may not be granted unless, under subsection 
(b), state remedies have been exhausted. Subsection {d) is 
devoted entirely to the scope of federal court examination of 
factual issues, which is restricted by the nature of the prior 
proceedings. Generally applicable principles of statutory con-
struction establish that the specific limitation on review of 
factual issues, with no comparable restriction on questions of 
law, means that the latter category of issues is to be examined 
by the federal courts without restriction. The plain meaning 
of §2254 is that Congress intended to give federal judges the 
power to determine questions of law and mixed questions of law 
and fact raised in habeas corpus petitions. 
2. The "full and fair hearing" 
S.2216 would bar federal court examination of a federal 
constitutional claim if the state courts provided a "full and 
fair hearing." This theory was invoked in Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465 (1976), to bar examination of a Fourth Amendment 
claim. Two years later, however, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
U.S. 545 (1978), the Supreme Court made clear that Stone was 
to be limited to the Fourth Amendment issue. In Rose, the 
Court refused to consider that a full and fair hearing in the 
state courts would bar federal court consideration of the is-
sue of a racially-biased system of selecting a grand jury fore-
man. The Court referred to the possible inability of a 
state judge to make reliable legal conclusions with respect to 
a challenge to the grand jury because the judge would be part 
of the court system which established the grand jury process. 
The present proposal to apply the "full and fair hearing"lirnit 








Although the proposed legislation is simplicity itself, 
the Notes of the Attorney General add other qualities to the 
provision. These augmentations could not derive from the 
proposal itself, and they demonstrate ·the proposal's trouble-
some nature. First, according to the Notes, the issue must 
be actually considered and decided on the merits by the state 
courts. Determination of this requirement at a habeas corpus 
hearing in the federal courts would be a time-consll!~ing and 
tedious process, if possible at all. If an issue is raised 
on direct appeal in the state courts, a federal court could 
not subsequently ascertain whether the issue was considered 
and decided if the state court decides the case without writ-
ing an opinion. A sununary decision without opinion is rou-
tine, and in many states most cases are decided that way. 
Thus, substantial federal court time would need to be devoted 
to prying into the practices of the local state courts. On 
collateral atatck in the state courts, the case may not only 
be determined without opinion, but without full appellate 
consideration of the merits. 
The Attorney General's Notes (at 38) next state that the 
state court's decision on the legal issue must be a "reason-
able one." "Reasonable" is an inappropriate test when a ques-
tion of law is involved. The Attorney General's Notes would 
explicitly permit a state court to ignore with impunity the 
law of its own circuit. On this theory of "reasonableness," 
there is no basis for compelling a state court to adhere to 
decisions of the Supreme Court. It might be similarly "rea-
sonable" to ignore all existing precedents and either to re-
vive a disapproved legal principle or to create a new legal 
theory. The Attorney General's position would constitute and 
~ encourage violations of the Supremacy Clause. It would also 
foster national disparity and lack of uniformity in enforce-
ment of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The criterion 
for federal review of state court decisions should not be the 
"reasonableness" of the decision, but whether or not the de-
cision is correct. A standard of "reasonableness" is simply 
insupportable. 
3. The constitutional defect 
Article III of the Constitution describes the judicial 
power of the United States as extending "to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution ... " as well as to 
other cases. Also pursuant to Article III, the Congress may 
create exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion and may grant jurisdiction over specified issues to the 




the Supremacy Clause, constitutional law as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court is binding on the states. Thus, under the fed-
eral Constitution, Congress must vest jurisdiction to hear con-
stitutional issues in some federal court, but may itself deter-
mine how to allocate the burden. 
Under 28 U.S.C. §1257, Congress has authorized the Supreme 
Court to consider in its certiorari jurisdiction constitutional 
questions arising from state court decisions. It is undisputed 
that the Supreme Court is 0ot able to consider every claim pre-
sented to it, and its own Rules include requirements forcer-
tiorari jurisdiction in addition to the presence of a consti-
tutional claim in the case. Thus, while the Court has power 
to review constitutional issues presented in cases arising on 
d i rect appeal from the state courts, the number of such cases 
actually reviewed by the Court in a given year is miniscule. 
The habeas corpus procedure is seen as a means of provio-
ing federal review of constitutional issues arising in state 
court decisions because of the limitations implicit in the 
structure of the Supreme Court. Restrictions on federal exam-
ination via habeas corpus contained in S.2216 would, in effect, 
leave the Article III power to review federal constitutional is-
sues unallocated. Thus, adoption of the proposal advanced in 
S.2216 would require consideration of alternative methods of 
allowing federal courts to examine issues now properly raised 
in habeas corpus petitions. Absent creation of alternative pro-
cedures, the habeas corpus procedure cannot be directly precluded 
or limited in such a way as to be, in effect, abolished. 
D. Fact Findings by the State Courts 
1. The current law 
Section 2254(d) sets out the circumstances under which fed-
eral courts may redetermine or relitigate fact findings made 
by the state courts. The application of §2254(d) is fully de-
scribed in Sumner v. Mata, 49 U.S.L.W. 4133 (S.Ct. Jan. 21, 1981): 
It is clear that in adopting the 1966 amend-
ments, Congress in §2254(d) intended not only 
to minimize that inevitable friction but to 
establish that the findings made by the state 
court system "shall be presumed to be correct" 
unless one of the seven conditions specific-
ally set forth in §2254(d) was found to exist 
in the federal habeas court. If-none ·of these 
seven conditions were found to exist, or un-
less the habeas court concludes that the 
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relevant state determination is not "fair-
ly supported by the record," "the burden 
shall rest upon the appellant to establish 
by convincing evidence that the factual de-
termination by the state court was erroneous!' 
Id., 49 U.S.L.W. at 4136. · 
The seven situations enumerated in the statute that permit 
federal redetermination of factual issues are these: 
(1) the merits of the ~actual dispute were not resolved 
in the state court; 
(2) the factfinding procedure of the state court was not 
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 
(3) the material facts were not developed at the state 
court hearing; 
(4) the state court lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter or of the person; 
(5) the petitioner was indigent and the state failed to 
11 2L' 
assign counsel in derogation of Sixth Amendment rights; 
(6) the petitioner was not given a full and fair hearing; 
(7) the hearing failed to accord with due process standards. 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court 
made clear that the limitation on the scope of federal review 
may be imposed, if at all, only after a "full and fair consider-
ation" of the . issue by the state courts. In using this refer-
ence, the Court cited to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, which 
provides the basis for the §2254(d) list of procedural require-
ments. 
The requirements of Townsend v. Sain and subsection (d), 
having been reaffirmed and having been found to be appropriate, 
should not be modified. 
Section 2254 permits federal examination of facts if the 
record as a whole does not fairly support the state court's 
findings of fact. In such cases, the burden of proving the 
"correct" facts is shifted to the petitioner. This test is 
the functional equivalent of the "clearly erroneous" standard, 
the traditional test for review of judicial fact findings. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 394-396 (1948); SA Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE., 152.03 
[l) and footnotes. The test is stated thus: when there is 
evidence to support a finding of fact, but the reviewing court, 
37 
112D 
based on its examination of the entire record. is nonetheless 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed. the reviewing court may reject the finding 
made by the lower court. Under §2254 (d). if review of the 
state court record reveals the state court's findings to be 
incorrect, the petitioner then has the burden of proof, but 
he is not faced with the burden of overcoming a presumption 
of correctness. 
2. Procedural limits to federal court fact finding in 
the proposals before Congress are unconstitutional 
and contrary to ABA policy. 
S . 653 and H.R. 4898 eliminate from the list of procedural 
defects in state courts' fact finding process that the peti-
tioner was denied a full and fair hearing and that the hear-
ing provided violated due process. S.2216 includes only a 
provision f or "full and fair hearing." 
Decis i ons such as Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), 
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), establish that in 
every instance in which a liberty interest ·is at stake, as it 
is in habeas corpus proceedings, requirements of due process 
must apply in the hearing provided and in the decision-making 
process. The components of a due process hearing in the con-
text of habeas corpus include the petitioner's presence at 
an evidentiary hearing, his right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, his right to subpoena evidence and to present wit-
nesses, his right to challenge illegal or incompetent evidence, 
his right to a neutral judge, and the fair and appropriate al-
location of particular burdens of proof and of the burden of 
going forward . See ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POST-
CONVICTION REMEDIES, Standard 4.6 (2d ed. 1980t The omission 
of due process requirements from the proposals leaves a habeas 
corpus petitioner without remedy if the state judge's neutral-
ity is impair ed. Compare Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1978). 
This consideration is important because post-conviction 
remedies used to raise constitutional issues in state courts 
and to exhaust state remedies are generally brought before the 
judge wh o tr i ed the case, and that judge's rulings or trial 
conduct may be the basis of the claimed constitutional viola-
tion.* Or the judge may have to determine the competency of 
*In one case the petitioner's claim was that his attorney had con-
flicting interests which caused a Sixth Anena:rent violatioo. The case carre 
before the state court judge -wi1o had, at trial, detennined that there was 












the attorney he assigned to represent the defendant or the 
constitutionality of the conduct of the prosecutor who is his 
colleague, or the sanity of a person he allowed to sit as a 
juror. In addition to the particular issues raised, the crime 
in the case may be a serious one and the sentence a long one. 
If the judge is popularly elected or subject to press criticism, 
his neutrality may be impaired. The due process provision re-
quires correction of the proceeding influenced by lack of 
neutrality of the fact finder. See,e.g., In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133 (1955h In re Ol~ver, 333 U.s. · 257 (1948~ Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927i _; 
In addition, the two subsections not included in S.653 and 
H.R. 4898 protect, for example, against the prosecutor's fail-
ure to disclose evidence, counsel's unpreparedness or ignorance, 
or the petitioner's absence at an evidentiary hearing. 
Restriction of federal court fact determination assumes 
an added significance if state appellate procedures are dis-
cretionary, as they may be on direct appeal or in post-convic-
tion procedures · (see, e.g., N.Y.C.P.L. §460.15) and the appel-
late courts are therefore incapable of providing systematic 
and expected state appellate oversight of trial judges' deci-
sions. 
As a matter of public policy, elimination of due process 
standards as the basis for federal court examination of state 
court decisions in which federal constitutional rights are to 
be determined is unwise because the elimination impairs the 
reliability of the fact finding process. Whatever interests 
the states may claim in desiring respect for the findings of 
fact made by their courts, such respect must be withheld if 
the procedures they employ in reaching decisions • impair the 
truthfulness and reliability of the findings. 
3. Substantive restrictions in the proposals require 
federal acceptance of unreliable "facts" and are 
an inapprorpiate substitute for the standard con-
tained in the statute. 
The second method of examination of state court fact find-
ings is an evaluation of their correctness. Section 2254 per-
mits federal examination if the record as a whole does not 
fairly support the state court's findings of fact. In such 
cases, the burden of proving the "correct" facts shifts to the 
petitioner. S.2216 presumes the correctness of state court 
findings of fact, and requires that the petitioner rebut the 
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federal court consideration of the correctness of state court 
fact findings unless no evidence appears in the state court 
record to support the finding made. H.R. 4898 would require 
that all evidence be viewed most favorably to the state and 
that a determination then be made whether or not a rati~nal 
fact finder could reach the findings made . These standards 
are fundamentally identical and should be rejected because 
their adoption would prohibit examination of a fact issue by 
the federal courts even.~£ supporting evidence in the state 
court record consisted of perjured or overtly biased testi-
mony, forged documents, or the conflicting testimony of one 
witness whose evidence bears indicia of reliability with that 
of another whose testimony is suspect. Both proposals remove 
from the scope of federal judicial review the power to deter-
mine what evidence is reliable or unworthy of acceptance be-
cause of inherent defects, and therefore of what evidence 
rationally supports the conclusion reached by the state court. 
An integral part of the fact finder's responsibility is the 
determination of what evidence is inherently unacceptable or 
incredible. 
The proposed standard for federal examination of state 
court fact findings is an attempt to codify the standard of 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319 (1979), and to apply it 
to all issues. The issue in Jackson is whether the defendant 
was convicted by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, as is constitutionally required by In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358 (1970). Jackson concluded that the standard for de-
termining the constitutionality of a state court decision up-
holding a conviction is whether, on the evidence taken most 
favorably to the state, a rational trier of fact could find 
the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard 
is used to determine this issue because the unique rold and 
functioning of the jury precludes examination of its decision 
making process. Deliberations are secret to prevent juror 
intimidation or harassment and to encourage frankness, free-
dom of discussion, and conference. See United States v. Dio-
guardi, 493 F.2d 70, 79 and nn.11 and 12 (2d Cir. 1974). The 
secrecy of the decision making process has as its purpose to 
allow jurors to compromise or render a verdict in the "teeth 
of both law and facts" in their role as conscience of the 
community. United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 889, 902-903 
(2d Cir. 1978), citing Dunn v . United States, 284 U.S. 310, 
393 (1932t In order to examine a jury verdict, a standard 
for review must be based on certain fixed assumptions. Thus, 
the standard for examination of a jury verdict is based on 
the assumption that the jury resolved the evidence against 
the defendant. It is an accommodation between the constitu-













against improper conviction. 
It is inappropriate to apply this standard to a judge's 
findings of fact necessary to determine constitutional issues 
n~t 7onnected or ~s~ociated wi~h jury findi~gs.* A judge's 
findings are traditionally suhJect to scrutiny for their cor-· 
rectness and are not based on an externally imposed assumption. 
E. The authority of federal magistrates to conduct 
habeas corpus hearings should be continued 
under 28 U. S :c. ll6J6 fbX1)(B). 
A United States magistrate may be designated by a federal 
district judge to hold an evidentiary hearing in a habeas cor-
pus case pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §636(bXl)(B). In fiscal 1981, 
federal magistrates held 243 hearings in the 5,270 habeas cor-
pus cases before them. Almost half, or 115, were held in the 
Fifth Circuit, and of these 42 were in Florida and 50 in Texas. 
1981 Report, Table M-t·atA-154-155. 
The criticism of this procedure is that federal magis-
trates, who are not Article III judges, will make credibility 
findings which will be automatically . accepted by the federal 
district judge to whom recommendations are made. The complaint 
does not seem to relate to the correctness of the magistrates' 
recommendations - only to whether Congress has permissibly 
granted such authorization. 
The language of 28 U.S. C. §636(bXl)(C) requires that the 
district court judge determine de novo those parts of the 
magistrate's report or specified proposed findings or recom-
mendations to which objection is made by a party to the case, 
including recommended findings of fact. Thus, the party 
~, unlike a jury verdict, verdict after a judge trial may be im-
peached by shJwi.ng an actual error. Harris v. Rivero, 50 U.S.L.'W. 3484 





against whom a fact finding is made may argue to the district 
judge that a witness is incredible or the testimony unworthy 
of belief and that the judge should hear the witness. The 
Supreme Court has sustained the validity of the magistrates' 
power under Article III because it is the judge-not the magis-
trate-who is the ultimate decision maker, and the judge may 
order a new hearing. United States v. Raddata, · · U.S; , 
100 S.Ct. 2406 (1980~ - . -
S.653 and H.R. 4898would require consent of the parties 
before a magistrate could hold a hearing. However, in light 
of the · authority and responsibility of federal district judges 
to review the findings of a magistrate, with the option of 
endorsing or rejecting the findings, federal magistrates should 
continue to be allowed to conduct habeas corpus hearings. 
Based on statistical data, it may be that there is some 
question as to the use of the magistrates' hearing power in 
Florida and Texas. -Perhaps conferences with the Circuit Con-
ferences of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, or with appropri-
ate district judges within those circuits, with a view to 
modifying local procedures, would alleviate the concerns that 
have been expressed. 
P. Appeal 
Section 3 of S.2216 gives courts of appeal the exclusive 
authority to issue the certificate of probable cause that is 
a jurisdictional prerequisite for appeal in habeas corpus 
cases if the appeal is taken by the petitioner. As was noted 
ante at 15, states may appeal as of right in those cases in 
which the district court granted the writ. The change that 
would be effected by the proposal is to eliminate a petition-
er's opportunity to seek a certificate of probable cause from 
t he district judge, and if that is denied to make a further 
application to the court of appeals. Section 3 would also 
require a certificate for appeal by a federal prisoner from 
a district court order denying a writ filed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C . §2255. Under the current law, no such certificate is 
required. 
District court certification processes now in effect pro -
vide an opportunity for the district judge to advise the court 
of appeals that, while he believes the decision denying the 
writ to be correct, the case nonetheless presents an important 
issue for review. The certification process takes little time, 
because the district judge is aware of the claims involved in 
the case and can quickly determine whether to grant the cer-
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application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal made 
to the court of appeals would require an extended motion and 
memorandum of law. In most cases such motions would be sub-
mitted by the petitioner pro _se because, as a general rule, 
counsel is not appointed by the district court. Thus, the 
court of appeals' consideration of the prose motion would 
require extended examination of the case. If the certificate 
is then granted, the court of appeals would review the case 
twice. · 
No certificate requirement should be imposed upon federal 
prison petitioners. Section 2255 remedies are the equivalent, 
for the federal prisoner, of a state post-conviction remedy. 
The federal district judge hearing the §2255 motion is the 
judge. before whom the case was tried, and the issues in the 
§2255 case may involve the trial judge's treatment of the case. 
Thus, an appeal from an order denying §2255 relief should be 
allowed the federal petitioner as of right. 
III. THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our analysis of habeas corpus concludes that the avail-
ability of the habeas corpus remedy does not delay punishment 
(except to delay execution of the death penalty), does not in-
terfere with prisoner rehabilitation, does not impose dispro-
portionate or unacceptable burdens upon the federal courts, 
and does not deprecate decisions of the state courts. In sum, 
the availability of the habeas corpus remedy does not affect 
law enforcement considerations. 
Our position also demonstrates that currently applicable 
statutes and rules provide adequate restrictions upon the in-
dividual petitioner who abuses or misuses the writ and that 
valid state court findings on the issues presented in federal 
habeas corpus petitions are fully protected. Recent Supreme 
Court decisions make clear that the procedural requirements 
demanded by the statute and judicial precedent will be care-
fully observed and strictly enforced. 
On the other hand, it is clear from the number of peti-
tions dismissed because of failure to state a federal consti-
tutional claim or because of procedural defects such as _lack 
of exhaustion of state remedies, procedural by-pass, or ade-
quate state court record, that cases come into the . federal 
courts inadequately prepared for presentation and disposition. 
It is also apparent that some cases ought to come before the 
federal courts earlier than they actually do and that peti-
tioners should be in a position of having their claims adju-
dicated as early as .possible so that they are not improperly 
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detained. Finally, we are told that numerous petitions may 
come from the same prisone~, raising one claim repeatedly or 
different claims successively. 
Such conditions should not exist. Federal courts should 
be presented with competently prepared documents that fully 
set out the issues to be considered, including appropriate 
citation to the record and to legal authority. Further, com-
pliance with procedural requirements should be alleged and 
outlined in the petition~ or an explanation included for fail-
ure so to have complied with state procedures. Federal judges 
should have before them all the relevant documents from the 
prior proceedings. 
Compliance with standards are properly expected by a 
court asked to decide a case. Compliance also benefits the 
petitioner, whose case is better presented and presumably 
carefully studied by a judge who need not overcome the hurdles 
of having to decipher the petition. Compliance with proce-
dural requirements also benefits the state- both its courts 
and its prosecutors-which can take appropriate steps to 
cure errors, or at least to be on notice as to the nature of 
the claimed defect in state procedure. 
Yet to meet these important interests, the current sys-
tem leaves the incarcerated prisoner to prepare his own peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, to attempt to articulate 
complex and substantive legal questions, and to face technical 
and involved procedures without appropriate legal assistance. 
Although general statistical data are not available, research 
in one jurisdiction shows that 95% of all prisoner petitions 
are filed prose. Requests for appointment of counsel are 
included in 90% of the petitions, and are granted in fewer 
than 3Z. The Robinson study found that 18% of the petition-
ers had counsel (Robinson at S6t There is no study showing 
why lawyers are not assigned more frequently; but the absence 
of a clear standard for assigning counsel in habeas corpus 
cases may be the reason. 
The proposed recormnendations have two purposes: disap-
proval of the substantive changes in the habeas corpus pro-
cedure which would be effected by enactment of the pending 
legislation; and adoption of a systematic method of reducing 
-if possible, eliminating- defects which are the subject of 
legitimate grievance. We anticipate that the plan advocated 
through the affirmative recommendations w~il reduce frivolous 
petitions and claim~, will eliminate inadequately prepared 
petitions, and will reduce unnecessary delays in the orocess-



























'"" ;(. ., ·. 
J 
·:·; 
• l 12~} 
Recommendation 2 encourages the prompt disposition of 
state appeals and post-conviction procedures requisite to the 
exhaustion of state remedies and to compliance with orderly 
state procedures. Methods of expediting state procedures in-
clude prompt preparation of the trial transcript and briefing 
of the direct appeal by attorneys; expeditious treatment of 
any necessary post-conviction petitions; use, where appropri-
ate, of a unified appeal/post-conviction procedure; and prompt 
submission of state court documents to the federal courts by 
the appropriate state offic~als in whose custody the necessary 
documents are retained. · 
Recommendation 3 proposes the prompt availability of com-
petent counsel for state appellate, post-conviction, or unified 
review procedures, for conference with incarcerated potential 
petitioners, and · for the habeas corpus proceeding if a non-
frivolous constitutional issue is presented by the case unless 
it is clear that the constitutional issue has not been exhausted 
in the state courts. The prompt availability of counsel cou-
pled with court-ordered scheduling for the filing of briefs 
and memoranda of law will encourage speedy processing of these 
cases. Assuming counsel's competence, the court will also be 
assisted in prompt disposition of the cases by the presence of 
counsel for the petitioner and the state. Counsel's papers 
should refer to appropriate legal authority and to relevant 
parts of the record. In all courts, counsel should also fully 
present the legal and factual arguments necessary to present 
the federal constitutional claims as such. The proposed con-
ference of counsel with potential prisoner petitioners will 
discourage the filing of frivolous petitions or petitions con-
taining frivolous claims. 
To assure the presence of competent and responsible coun-
sel, lawyers should be compensated at a fair rate and a system 
of monitoring attorney performance should be instituted. 
Recommendation 4 proposes a high standard for measuring 
attorney competence. The standard should be: 
... the exercise of skill and knowledge ex-
pected of an attorney experience in the 
practice of criminal and constitutional law. 
Such a standard should guide counsel providing representation 
to habeas corpus petitioners. This should also be the stan-
dard used by the courts in evaluating counsel's performance 
as a Sixth Amendment issue and for determining whether there 
is cause to excuse counsel's failure in state courts to raise 
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a particular constitutional issue. The presence of competent 
counsel should permit strict enforcement of the current rules 
against delayed filing and successive petitions unless an ex-
ception to the rules applies in a particular instance. 
N. CONCLUSION 
The Report and Recommendations of the Criminal Appellate 
Issues Connnittee of the Section of Criminal Justice concerning 
habeas corpus were approved.by the Criminal Justice Section 
Council at its regularly scheduled meeting on April 24 and 25, 
1982. 
The Section of Criminal Justice urges the American Bar 
Association to oppose the restrictions on access to the fed-
eral courts _by state prisoners through petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus which are the basis of the proposed legislation 
pending before the Congress. The Section of Criminal Justice 
further urges the American Bar Association to adopt the recom-
mendations of the Section which will expedite the processing 
of habeas corpus cases and provide competent representation 
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Hr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 
The American Bar Association is pleased to appear before you to 
express our views on the subject of S. 238, legislation entitled, "To 
Reform Procedures for Collateral Review of Criminal Judgments." Ky name 
is Phylis Skloot Bamberger. As a member of the Council of the ABA 
Criminal Justice Section, I have been designated by ABA President William 
W. Falsgraf to represent the Association. 
I am Attorney-in-Charge of .the appeals unit of the Federal Defender 
of the Legal Aid Society of New York City. In that capacity, my 
colleagues and I represent habeas corpus petitioners in the district 
courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. As counsel in these 
cases we have been involved with every aspect of habeas corpus procedure, 
including evidentiary hearings, and have been concerned with the 
procedural and substantive issues that arise in habeas corpus cases. 
The American Bar Association reflects the legal profession as a 
whole, and similarly, the Section of Criminal Justice is representative 
of all segments of the criminal justice system. Our members include 
state and federal prosecutors, private defense lawyers, public defenders, 
judges, law professors, and law enforcement officials. 
INTRODUCTION 
The American Bar Association supports the statutory scheme for habeas 
corpus currently in effect. The Association opposes the proposed 
legislation, S. 238, because it does not address the real problems in 
habeas corpus proceedings, it ends virtually all access to federal courts 
by way of habeas corpus, and it is based upon faulty legal premises, 
misused statistics and mistaken policy concerns. Most significantly, we 
are concerned that while the unambiguous language of S. 238 denies access 
to the federal courts, those concerned with the meaning and impact of the 
bill will be mislead by the applicable legislative history, S.Rep.No. 
92-226 (98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983)(which was prepared for S. 1768, the 
identical preceding ~ill)(hereinafter "Report"), and wrongly convinced 
that the bill's language can be modified by the Report so that S. 238 
means something quite different from what it actually says. Kven if the 
Report's rewriting of S. 238 succeeds, that meaning is unacceptable under 
the Constitution . 
Further, the Report refers only to the judges and states attorneys 
who supported the prior identical bill . Omitted is reference to those . 
who testified at the April 1982 hearings in opposition to the habeas 
corpus legislation and to the opinion of others opposing the legislation, 
including the American Bar Association. By so doing the Report suggests 
there is a lack of concern about and opposition to this bill, which is 
certainly not the case. 
Indeed, the Report cites as support for its position Justice Steven's 
d i ssenting opinion in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 546 (1982). The 
Justice's complete words, however, are fundamentally at odds with the 
pl an and effect of this bill and identifies the writ as "a fundamental 
guarantee of liberty": 
In recent years federal judges at times have lost 
sight of the true office of the great writ of habeas 
corpus. It is quite unlike the common law writ of 
error that enabled a higher court to correct errors 
committed by a nisi prius tribunal in the trial of 
civil or criminal cases by ordering further 
proceedings whenever trial error was detected. The 
writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental guarantee of 
liberty. 
When [habeas corpus relief is confined to cases 
that truly involve fundamental unfairness] there 
should be no question about the retroactivity of the 
constitutional rule being enforced. Nor do I believe 
there is any need to fashion definitions of "cause" · 
and "prejudice" to determine whether an error that was 
not preserved at trial or on direct appeal is subject 
to review in a collateral federal proceeding. The 
availability of habeas corpus relief should depend 
primarily on the character of the alleged consti-
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tutional violation and not on the procedural history 
underlying the claim. 
The "total exhaustion" rule the Court crafts today 
demeans the high office of the great writ. Perhaps a 
rule of this kind would be an appropriate response to 
a flood of litigation requesting review of minor 
disputes. An assumption that most of these petitions 
are groundless might be thought to justify technical 
pleading requirements that would provide a mechanism 
for reducing the sheer number of cases in which the 
merits must be considered. But the Court's experience 
has taught us not only that most of these petitions 
lack merit, but also that there are cases in which 
serious injustice must be corrected by the issuance of 
the writ. In such cas~s. the statutory requirement 
that adequate state remedies be exhausted must, of 
course, be honored. When a person's liberty is at 
stake, however, there surely is no justitification for 
the creation of needless procedural hurdles. · 
Procedural regularity is a matter of fundamental 
importance in the administration of justice. But 
procedural niceties that merely complicate and delay 
the resoluti~n of disputes are another matter. In my 
opinion the federal habeas corpus statute should be 
construed to protect the former and, whenever 
possible, to avoid the latter. 
Finally, it is important to note that those who will be affected by 
denial of access to the federal courts are for the most poor and 
uneducated, and many are illiterate and non-English speaking. A high 
proportion are minority groups members
1 
with little appreciation of the 
judicial process they have passed through. Many were represented at 
trial and on appeal by assigned lawyers who were inexperienced at 
criminal trial practice, unfamiliar with criminal law issues and 
procedures, and minimally paid.
2 
Many habeas petitioners were subject-
I In 1982, 47% of the state prison population was black and blacks made 
up more than 50% of the Southern prison population. Prisoners in State 
and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1982, at 6-7 {Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Department of Justic~, 1984). 
2 This is confirmed by information in issues of Indigent Defense 
Information, the publication of the American Bar Association, Standing 
Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants: Bar Information Program. 
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ed to very long delays before their cases were reviewed by state 
appellate courts, and until the new decision in Evitts v. Lucy, 105 S.Ct. 
850 (1985), were not even assured of the right to competent appellate 
counsel . These people file their petitions for habeas corpus, with rare 
exceptions, without the aid of counsel, legal assistance, or access to 
legal research material, and without the records of their cases. These 
prose pet i tions usually disclose little comprehension of the complex 
legal issues involved, of the l~portance of setting out the significant 
facts, and of the need to explain compliance with state procedures. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WRIT AS A REMEDY 
Proponents of S. 238 regularly reiterate that many habeas corpus 
petitions are frivolous. They therefore seek to limit access to federal 
courts by all petitioners. 
A most important consideration in any discussion of whether access to 
federal courts by all should be virtually eliminated is the significance 
of habeas corpus as remedy against violation of constitutional rights. 
Basic rights which provide the cornerstone of our criminal justice system 
have historically been protected through habeas corpus proceedings 
because Supreme Court review is limited to a few cases each year. Recent 
cases demonstrate that continued federal protection is essential to the 
control of official unconstitutional behavior . A short sampling of 
significant precedents will illustrate this point: 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and the standard for review; 
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), prohibited use 
of physically coerced confessions; 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), prohibits 
presumption shifting the burden of proof to the 
de f ense; 
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Davis v. Zant, 721 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd 
on rehearing, Davis v. Kemp, 752 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 
1985); Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Marchetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), 
gross unrepresentation of blacks and women on the jury 
pool; 
Peek v. Kemp, 746 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1984); Green v. 
Zant, 715 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1983), jurors refusing 
to vote guilty forced by fellow jurors to excuse 
themselves due to iilness; 
Anderson v. Warden, 696 F.2d 296 (4th Cir. en bane 
1982), judge took witnesses to chambers and pressed 
them to change their testimony; 
~ 
Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979), 
exculpatory witness for the defense deliberately 
concealed by a police detective; 
Lockett v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978), 
prosecutor paid two defense witnesses to leave the 
area; 
Clarke v. Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981), two 
informants sent by police on another transaction 
making them unavailable for the defendant's trial; 
Henson v. Wyrick, 634 F.2d 1080 (8th Cir. 1981) and 
Thompson v. White, 680 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982), hand 
selection by sheriff of potential jurors who he 
thought would make "good jurors." 
Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1984), 
lawyer representing the state in a suit against its 
jury selection system fails to raise the issue of the 
jury selection for his criminal defendant client; 
Williams v. Franzen, 687 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981); Camera 
v. Fogg, 658 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1129 (1981), one counsel represents several defendants 
with conflicting defenses; 
Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1982), in 
violation of double jeopardy, state sought to retry 
the defendant, although his case had been reversed on 
state appeal for failure of proof; 
Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1983), 
evidence that a retarded and illiterate defendant was 
not compet9nt to plead guilty six year earlier; 
Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1985), use 
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Farmer v, Harris, 84 Civ. 1482 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), , change 
in prosecution theory after jury begin• deliberations 
and the defense cannot reapond ls prohibited. 
Th••• cases represent only• • mall and random eampllng of the iaaues 
baalc to the fairnaa • ot the criminal proce11 which regularly come befote 
the courta on habeas corpus. Moat of the •• case, would never reach the 
federal courts if S. 238 ware enacted. It 1• particularly inter•ating 
that even this small sample demonstrate• that 1imllar types of 
misbehavior recur over the year, and that not even the threat of federal 
ovarelght detera aorne forms of u~conatltutional behav1or. 
The argumant to restrict or dany access becau• a 10 ~any habeas corpus 
petitions are frivolous appears ba;ed on the conclu• ion that all writs 
which ara denied are frivolou9. However, a diatinctlon ls made 10 the 
cases between frivolous claima and those which are arguable and havQ 
merit, but do not ju;tlfy relief. Many petitions are denied, not because 
they are frivolous, but bQcause despite mQrit the numerous conaidarations 
which go into affording relitf do not ultimately justify the final atep 
of a new trial or relea• e. These cases, like all other mattara before 
the cou~ts, require careful consideration of facts and law. The unique 
respect given to state court fact findings in habeas corpus cases add9 
another dirnenalon for con1idaration and denial. See Rushen v. Spain, 46~ 
U.S. 114 (1983)9 H@rshall v. Lonb9rger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983); SumnQr v. 
Hata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982); sumnar y, Mate, 499 U.S. 539 (1981). 
In part, tha reason for the denial of many patltlon, has been ch~ngaa 
in faderal substantive law. Recent federal declsiono have reatrlcted 
constitutional protections, particularly in the araaa of ,elf-incrimi-
nation, double punishment, judicial and proaecutorial misconduct, coun,al 
competence, and jury instructions and jury misconduct. The most far-
reaching modiflc&tlon baa bQeQ 1n the level of prejudice required before 
relief will be granted tor constitutional error. Another re&1on for 
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'denial of writs is that many petitioners, acting without counsel, are 
simply unable to prepare petitions and present claims so as to reveal the 
basis for relief under the legal standards, particularly on the issue of 
prejudice. Prose petitioners find it difficult, if not beyond their 
ability, to explain that they have complied with procedural requirements 
for access to the federal courts. This is particularly true for the 
required showing that state procedural rules ha~e been met. Our 
experience is that states' attorneys interpose absurd, and often 
incorrect, interpretations of state law, and that prose petitioners 
simply do not have the knowledge or ability to prepare a response. Thus, 
some petitions considered frivolous by the courts are in fact not so and 
a clear and adequate explanation of the claims would show them to present 
significant issues properly before the court. We have found this to be 
the situation in many cases to which we are assigned. 
Finally, there are a group of petitions which are not properly before 
the courts because no federal claim is presented or because of a 
procedural bar. In these cases, the petition or claim should be 
withdrawn before the judge even examines the case. In our experience, 
many petitioners are agreeable to withdrawing the petition or claim if 
the defect in the position is made clear to the petitioner. In those 
instances in which the petitioner refuses to withdraw a frivolous claim, 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), provides a key. Under Anders, 
if an attorney representing a client on appeal, having full knowledge of 
law and fact, believes the case to present only frivolous issues, the 
attorney may so advise the court in a full explanation. The court, after 
independent examination, may dismiss the case. 
Many of the problems can be resolved by making available counsel who 
will prepare properly drafted petitions or, in frivolous cases, advise 
withdrawal of the claims or petitions, or alternatively file a brief 
- 7 -
comparable to that allowed in Anders. 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS CITED TO SUPPORT THE LEGISLATION 
The policy concerns of the proponents of limitation on habeas corpus 
have been articulated in the Report. These concerns are not 
justification for passage of S. 238. 
l. Friction Between State and Federal Judges 
The Report (at 3 and 4) cites as a policy concern the friction 
between state and federal judges allegedly generated by habeas corpus 
procedures. This friction is inherent in any system of interrelated 
governmental structures. It exists between Congress and the Executive 
Branch, between the federal courts and Congress, between the various 
levels of the federal courts, between executive agencies, between federal 
cabinet officials and state governments, between local and federal 
officials. The fact that this list can be expanded virtually without end 
demonstrates that frictions between social and political structures are 
natural. 
The usual existence of such frictions is not negative, but is a 
valuable check within the system. Here, the writ of habeas corpus helps 
to protect individuals against infringement of their federal 
constitutional rights by public officials who are antagonistic to those 
rights. The public interest in preserving constitutional rights is of 
greater import than consideration of whether judges of different 
jurisdictions suffer a personal pique based on review of their wor~ . 
Indeed, like all of us, judges do make mistakes. The danger due to 
judicial error is greater because of judicial power. The oversight 
system is a check on that power. 
In reciting the expected benefits of S. 238, the Report (at 27) 
quotes Justice O'Connor on the benefit of deference to the state courts 
and finality of their judgments. It must be noted, however, that 
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Michigan v. Long, 103 s.ct. 3469 (1983), written by Justice O'Connor, 
reversed the 38-year-old Supreme Court precedent of Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 
U.S. 117 (1947) . . Under Herb an independent and adequate state ground as 
the basis for a state decision precluded federal review of the state 
decision even if the state court spoke about federal constitutional 
issues; only if the federal question was essential to the decision in the 
case did the Supreme Court review the state court decision and the 
presumption favored the adequat& and independent state grounds. South ---
Carolina v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916, 925 (1983)(Stevens J., dissenting). 
Long reversed the presumption of adequate independent state grounds 
and applied a presumption against state law basis for decision-making 
even though a state court cites its own constitution. Long provided that 
when the Supreme Court decides that the state law basis of the decision 
is unclear, presumption is that federal law either compelled or was the 
basis of the result. Justice Stevens dissented, criticising the 
presumption as one undermining respect for the state courts, resulting in 
advisory opinions, using scarce judicial resources, and causing 
inappropriately early Supreme Court intervention. In light of this 
reversal of the Herb presumption, the claim that S. 238 is motivated by 
rankling between federal and state judges must be viewed with skepticism. 
In this discussion of judicial friction, the Report also notes (at 3) 
that state judges resent having their decisions overturned by a single 
federal judge. However, if a petition for writ of habeas corpus is 
granted, the State has an automatic right of appeal to the appropriate 
federal Court of Appeals, and if not successful there, may apply to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, the state court judges' 
decisions in a case are not overturned by a single, lower federal judge. 
By comparison, a petitioner whose habeas corpus application is denied may 
appeal that denial only by permission. Thus, while a single federal 
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judge may deny a writ, that judge is not solely res,onsible for gra11ting · , 
one if the state wants review. 
Furthermore, the review by federal judges, appointed for life and 
presumably not subject to political pressures, and therefore more able to 
render decisions free of public pressure, is itself justification for 
federal oversight . 
2. Judicial Overload 
Advocates of restriction assert that a l arge number of habeas corpus 
petitions are filed, requiring th e expend i ture of substantial federal 
judicial time. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
reports, however, that for the year ending June 30, 1984, state prisoners 
filed 8,335 habeas corpus petitions , down from 1983 . These represent a 
mere 3.3~ of the total of 251,485 federal civil filings and less than 
one-seventh of the 56,586 state law diversity of citizenship cases 
filed . Further, 7,883 habeas corpus petitions were disposed of without 
court action or before pretrial proceedings. Only 138 went to trial, of 
which 134 took two days or less to try. This compares to a total of 
14,374 civil trials, of which 4,939 took more than two days to try. 
While total civil filings increased by 45,292 cases between 1982 and 
1984, the percentage of state prisoner petitions to the whole declined by 
. 6~ . 
3 . Respect for State Decisions . 
The decisions of the Supreme Court require that a petitioner present 
the factual basis for the federal claim and the federal theory to the 
state courts for consideration prior to presenting the claim to the 
federal courts (Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971)), and that proper 
state procedures be used to present that claim to the state courts. 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Absent these requirements, 
federal courts will not generally review the claims, although there are 
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some exceptions. If the issue has been presented to the state courts, 
the state fact findings are presumed correct (see cases ante at 6). 
These cases fully protect state court decisions, preclude efforts to 
avoid the state courts, and require that the states be given first 
opportunity to consider the issue. 
The importance of the exhaustion requirement is fully appreciated by 
petitioners. In a study done of a group of "petitioners," 81~ of 
petitioners whose writs were pe~~ing were having or had direct state 
appeals, 98.6~ of petitioners whose habeas cases were on review in 
federal courts had direct state appellate review, and 44~ of petitioners 
had a collateral attack in state courts, and 20~ had filed more than 
one. Habeas Corpus at 6 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department 
of Justice, 1984). 
PROVISIONS OF S. 238 
1. Section Sa (§2254(d)) 
The most restrictive provision is proposed Section 2254(d), the 
full-and-fair adjudication provision. This section will preclude federal 
court consideration of the merits of a federal constitutional claim fully 
and fairly adjudicated by state courts. The language precludes 
consideration of whether the state decision was correct. Because under 
the bill the correct legal result is unnecessary to a preclusion based on 
a full and fair adjudication, federal constitutional rights as previously 
determined by the Supreme Court or federal courts of appeal may be 
violated and individuals left without recourse. 
It is clear from this result that an individual's federal 
constitutional rights would be unprotected due to this provision. 
Equally disturbing is the fully predictable more general impact of this 
provision . Because there will be no requirement of a uniform application 
of federal constitutional principles of law, constitutional rights will 
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undoubtedly vary from state to state, depending on local philosophies and · , 
politics. Thus, it is possible to have SO interpretations of federal 
constitutional provisions. The residents of the same state will also be 
subject to unequal application of federal constitutional doctrine, the 
result variable depending upon the individual state judge, unless state 
supreme courts accept review to reconcile conflicting federal law rulings. 
The second predictable result of the proposal is the loss of the 
traditional "constitutional floor" provided by adherence to U.S. Supreme 
Court constitutional interpretailons. The essence of federalism here is 
that the federal constitution provides a level of protection for 
individual rights below which the states may not go . The states are free 
to evolve state constitutional protections affording greater safeguards 
for the individual, but the state may not reduce protections below those 
of the federal constitution . In a structure such as the one proposed, 
there will be a theoretical floor set by the Supreme Court in the few 
decisions coming to it from state courts of highest jurisdiction. 
However, the application of constitutional doctrine as articulated by the 
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts will not be generally enforced 
as in the past through habeas corpus or the possibility of federal review 
through habeas corpus. 
Ironically, the effect of the proposed legislation will be to produce 
a diversity of treatment of the type that the Congress criticized in 
federal sentencing and which it sought to correct by new sentencing 
guidelines included in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 
Diversity in federal constitutional protection should be of no less 
thoughtful concern than in federal sentencing. 
The full and fair adjudication concept is taken from Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S . 465 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that issues of 




examined by federal courts on habeas corpus review because the remedy 
the exclusion of the evidence seized -- was not a constitutionally 
derived cure and was only a deterrent against illegal police activity 
which was effectuated by state court proceedings challenging the search 
and seizure . The Court has thus far not expanded the Stone rule to apply 
to what may be called errors of constitutional dimension. There is no 
doctrinal basis for applying the full and fair adjudication doctrine to 
constitutional rights. : 
Advocates of this legislation assert that the just-described under-
standing of S . 238 is incorrect because, despite the statutory language, 
the Report requires that the federal court examine the state decision to 
determine its ''reasonableness" on issues of law, fact, and application of 
law to fact. This portion of the Report is derived from the Department 
of Justice submission to the Senate dated Karch 3, 1982, and reprinted in 
hearing on s. 2216, Committee on the Judiciary of the United States 
Senate (97th Cong. 2d. Sess. April 1, 1982). However the position 
articulated in th~ Report is not incorporated into the bill, nor is there 
reason to believe the assurance that the courts will have the power to 
interpret th e language of the bill in accord with the Report. 
Consequently, assurance in the Report that substantive issues considered 
by the state courts will be re-examined by the federal courts is 
unfounded. 
Th e full and fair adjudication language of proposed Section 2254(d) 
is a term of art understood by all to refer to judicial procedure. That 
term has an understood meaning, as is fully acknowledged by the Report. 
Indeed, it is legislatively codified in the current 2254(d). 
The Report (at 24) explicitly redefines this term of art to apply to 
the substantive decisions in the case . Then the Report sets out the 
judicial analysis required to apply the new definition . Thus, proponents 
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of the l~gislation argue that S . 238, if passed, wi : l include the entire 
scheme for adjudicating cases as included in the Report even though the 
Report will never have been voted upon. This attempt to legislate by 
evading the legislativep rocess is impermissible. 
Furthermore, the constitutional requirements for passing legislation 
cannot be avoided by the argument that the Report constitutes legislative 
history that the courts will use in interpreting and applying S. 238. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court state that when the court "find[s] the 
' 
t e rms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete," United 
State s v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 ( 1961), "except in • rare and 
exceptional circumstances.'" Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 
( 1981), quoting TVA. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); Crooks v. 
Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)). A court should ignore the clear 
language of a statute only when "acceptance of the meaning would lead to 
absurd results ... or would thwart the obv i ous purpose of the statute," 
Trans Alaskan Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978), or would 
"produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 
(1982). 
Here, t he language of the statute is unambiguous and its terms, well 
defined by t he Supreme Court and incotporated in current statutes, are 
known to refer to procedural issues and not substantive ones. Further, 
the use of the new definition and scheme for review of the substantive 
decision which is created in the Report is totally i nconsistent with the 
intent and purpose of the statute as set out in the Report. The Report 
(at 4) states that the present system of habeas corpus is "a gigantic 
waste of effort;" that it involves "duplication of judicial effort'' when 
federal courts ·are strained by criminal case loads (Report at 5), that it 
involves mandatory readjudications that result in pointless and 
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duplicative relitigation of claims (Report at 6), and that readjudication 
defies common sense and sound judicial policy (Report at 23). The Report 
says the intent of S. 238 is to end relitigation and to reduce court time 
involved in habeas corpus cases. According to the Report problems will 
be solved because "reform is likely to make it possible to decide cases 
more easily and with less extensive litigation" (Report at 6) and that 
proposed legislation would abbreviate and simplify litigation in habeas 
corpus cases (Report at 28). 
However, the so-called reform created in the Report, but not io the 
legislation, will produce the opposite result. According to the Report, 
the legal scheme requires deference to the state court opinion 
. when, 1n the Federal courts' own estimation, 
such differences as they may have with the State 
courts reflect at most reasonable differences of 
opinion concerning the interpretation or application 
of Federal law, or pertinent factual conclusions, in 
cases in which the proper determination is unclear. 
(Report at 24). The question posed by this scheme is how the federal 
judge is to determine whether he has the kind of difference of opinion 
with the state judge that merits review of the substantive issue. It 
appears that the federal judge must make four or more decisions: Is the 
proper determination of the case unclear? If so, does the federal judge 
have a more than reasonable difference of opinion on legal issues? On 
factual issues? On mixed law and fact questions? If the state opinion is 
deemed unreasonable on any of these three, what is the constitutionally 
correct decision? There is no guidance as to what makes a decision 
unconstitutional but reasonable or what factors are to be considered in 
deciding whether a state judge is reasonable. May a judge's opinion be 
reasonable if based on fiscal, political, social or philosophical 
considerations? Traditional legal analysis, scornfully defined in the 
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Report as ''hairsplitting" (Report at 28), is simply transferred to the 
new application of the word reasonable, one that has .1ever before been 
used in a context such as this. This new scheme does not reduce the 
alleged complexity of habeas corpus proceedings; it does the opposite and 
thus the legislative history cannot change the meaning of S. 238's 
language. 
Furthermore, the Report itself presents an ambiguous scheme for 
adjudication on the merits. It •says in one instance that the reasonable-
ness standard precludes review if the proper determination is unclear 
(Report at 25); on the other hand, a later explanation imposes no limit 
on the application of the reasonableness doctrine (Report at 27), 
appearing to preclude federal consideration of an issue if the state 
court is wrong even if federal law is clear. This ambiguity in the 
Report precludes its use to rewrite the meaning of the words of the 
statute. United States v. Oregon, supra . In sum, the Report misleads 
its reader into thinking that the legislation has a meaning different 
than that conveyed by its language. The language in effect bars access 
to the federal courts for consideration on the merits of the federal 
constitutional issues. 
However, even if the statute can quite literally be rewritten by its 
legislative history, the application of the reasonableness standard to 
decisions on questions of law or to mixed questions of law and fact is 
unconstitutional and inappropriate. As the Report notes (at 27), state 
judges take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. So 
do federal judges. And adherence to the scheme created in the Report 
would mandate violation of the oath by compelling federal judges to 
refrain from overturning those decisions they consider to be 
constitutionally infirm, albeit not unreasonable. This action taken by 
the federal judge would violate the supremacy clause. 
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Furthermore, it appears that the basis of a reasonableness finding 
can be non-legal concerns, thereby interjecting into constitutional 
analysis irrelevant political or social factors. Thus, for example, it 
may be viewed as reasonable, in a fiscal sense, for an indebted community 
to save public funds by having multiple defendants represented by the 
same counsel. However, the multiple representation would be 
constitutionally defective if a conflict affected the representation, 
even though it was reasonable urrder the fiscal circumstances. 
2. Section S(c) of (S2254(d)) 
The flip side of the bill's denial of access for claims considered by 
the state courts is the denial of access if the issue has not been 
presented to the state courts in accordance with required state 
practice. This limitation, called procedural default, is a greatly 
revised codification of the decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 
( 1977). 
The bill codifies the Wainwright rule by revising it to make it a 
procedural strait-jacket. While the codification as expressed in the 
language of the bill appears to adopt Wainwright to bar all federal 
examination of issues if there was a procedural default except for cause 
and actual prejudice, the Report, once again changing the apparent 
meaning of the language, substantially revises the bill. The bill, 
either as written or as reinterpreted by the Report, is not justified on 
policy grounds and raises substantial constitutional questions. 
The policy justification for S. 238 is that at present the Wainwright 
rules are "beset with fundamental uncertainties" (Report at 7; see also 
Report at 8) and problems (Report at 12), and the bill would avoid the 
need to resolve the problems through case law development (Report at 8). 
However, the Report, which was written in 1983, obviously is unable to 
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deal with the most recent judicial decisions, ~·hich do resolve some of 
the so-called uncertainties, and with new constitutionally based 
decisions that S . 238 and the Report will make hopelessly complex issues. 
What is quite amazing to those of us i nvolved in the litigation 
process is the speed with which definitive interpretations of the 
Wa inwright principles have come through judicial decisions, and the 
r e lative consistency of those interpretat i ons. In the eight years since 
Wa inwright, it has become clear law that counsel's failure to preserve an 
i s sue in trial court proceedings will not constitute ''cause" unless the 
issue is one which counsel could not have known about at the time the 
error was made because there was no law upon which to base a legal 
argument. If "the tools" for making a legal objection were available, 
counsel ' s failure to do so is not cause . This rule, explored first in 
Engel v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) , was re-examined and applied in Reed 
v. Ross, 52 U.S . L .W . 4905 (S.Ct. June 26, 1984). 
On the question of what constitutes an excuse or cause for not 
following state procedures, S. 238 as rewritten by the Report, does not 
assist the legal development that is underway in the Courts. Rather , it 
creates a rule which makes judicial decisions irreconcilable. This comes 
about because the Report (at 13) rewrites the bill to include as cause 
t he incompetence of counsel under Sixth Amendment standards. But the 
Supreme Court decision in Strickland v . Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
( 1984), decided since the Report was written, redefined Sixth Amendment 
i ncompetence. Under Strickland, counsel's conduct constitutes 
i ncompetence if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probab i lity is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." 104 S.Ct. at 2068. This test for 
prejudice is different from the requ i red level of prejudice due to other 
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· constitutional errors . See, discussion of levels of prejudice in United 
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). Therefore, S. 238 may preclude 
relief based on subitantive constitutional error because a procedural bar 
cannot be overcome due to the inconsistent standards for showing ''cause." 
As earlier noted, the codification of Wainwright is really a 
revision. It would define procedural default as any failure to comply 
with state rules. However, it has already been judicially determined 
under Wainwright that there is no procedural default if the state itself .. 
excuses the failure to comply with local rules and considers an issue on 
the merits. Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981). The state's 
interest in enforcing its rules is said not to exist if the state itself 
does not require adherence to them. The blanket definition of default in 
the bill and the Report precludes consideration of those instances where 
all notions of fairness would warrant a different result. 
The Report (at 15) would apply the Wainwright forfeiture standard to 
all constitutional errors, including those defined as "basic." 
7 raditionally, those rights defined as basic require a knowing and 
intelligent waiver by the defendant (right to counsel, jury trial, entry 
of plea, decision to testify, and right to pursue an appeal, Jones v . 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983)) (See ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule l . 2(a) and, if they are violated, reversal occurs without a 
showing of prejudice (use of a coerced confession, absence of counsel, 
conflict of interest by counsel, denial of neutral judge or jury. United 
States v. Hastings, 461 U.S . 491, 508 n.6 (1983)) . The Report expressly 
states that these rights can be lost by procedural default rather than 
requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant and- requires 
that prejudice be shown. This application of S. 238 changes the standard 
for constitutional waiver and is thus unconstitutional . 
With this provision of the bill, as with the one on full and fair 
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adjudication, the clear meaning of the ~anguage in the bill is changed by 
t he Report (at 13). ~he bill defines cause as "state action in violation 
of the constitution or laws of the United States." The Report defines 
state action to include ineffective assistance of counsel. To justify 
this notion, the Report relies on Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 
(1980), a case involving counsel with a conflict of interests . The 
language of Cuyler states: 
[t)he Sixth Amendment d6es mo r e than require the 
States to appoint counsel for i ndigent defendants. 
The right to counsel preven t s the States from 
conducting trials at which persons who face 
incarceration must defend themselves without adequate 
legal assistance ... 
Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself 
implicates the State in the defendant's conviction, we 
see no basis for drawing a distinction between 
retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal 
justice to defendants who must choose their own 
lawyers. 
The language of Cuyler does not reach the meaning the government 
attributes to it. The state action in Cuyler was not the incompetent 
counsel, but the state's conduct of the trial with incompetent counsel. 
Further, the claim that incompetence of counsel is state action was 
rejected by the Court in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), 
decided after Cuyler. Consequently, the Report's effort to re-define the 
bill's "state action" language to include counsel's action, even if it 
were permissibl e (see ante at 14) is of questionable effectiveness. 
While the effort to include counse l 's competence was salutary it seems 
likely to fail. Therefore, the primary ground for cause remaining in the 
bill is state action. Limitation of cause to this ground is inappropriate 
and will work real injustice if some other reason, such as counsel's 
performance, the defendant's illness, state procedures that are unduly 
complex, or another unforeseeable factor exists as an acceptable basis 
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for failing to use state procedures. 
This discussion shows that the bill's provisions for procedural 
default are unconstitutional and generate more confusion then presently 
exists. 
3. Statute of Limitations - Section 2 CS2244(e)) 
The bill establishes a one year statute of limitations for the filing 
of habeas petitions. The time is to run from the exhaustion of state 
remedies, the removal of a State-action bar to the filing of the 
~ 
petition, from the date of a Supreme Court decision recognizing a new 
right which is retroactive and from the discovery of a factual predicate 
for a claim which could not have been discovered earlier. 
The justification for the statute of limitations is that petitioners 
deliberately delay filing their federal petitions so that, if the 
petition succeeds and a new trial is ordered in their case, the state 
will have lost its ability to conduct a retrial. There are no data to 
support this claim; indeed, there does not appear to be any evidence upon 
which it may be concluded that late filings are deliberate efforts by 
prisoners to sabotage further state proceedings against them. American 
Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 22-2.4 (2d. ed. 
1980)(Cornmentary). 
Of course, the filing of the federal petition must be postponed until 
completion of the state appellate and post-conviction proceedings 
necessary to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion of available state 
remedies. This can often take several years. 3 Indeed in one recent 
3 In one study, the mean length of time involved in pursuing direct 
appeals of criminal convictions in state courts varied from 10 to 31 
months. Washy, et al., Volume and Delay in State Appellate Courts: 
Problems and Responses 29-32 (National Center for State Courts 1979). In 
1981, a study was published involving six appellate courts and 5,900 
direct appeals filed in 1975 and 1976. The average time from the lower 
court judgment to issuance of the appellate mandate was shown to be from 
240 days to 648 days. Appellate Court Delay 86 (National Center for 
State Courts 1981). 
- 21 -
case the time involved for state appeals and state collateral proceedings 
was six years. A re~ent study shows that the average time between 
convict i on and exhaustion of state remedies was between 2.5 and 2.8 
years . The same study estimated that approximately 43~ of petitions 
would be barred by the one year statute of limitations. Habeas Corpus, 
at 7 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, 1984). 
A period of limitations will also necessitate successive petitions. 
As each separate claim is exhau~ted, a petition raising that claim must 
be filed within the statutory period but cannot include claims not yet 
exhausted. Because different kinds of claims are exhausted in different 
state proceedings, exhaustion does not occur simultaneously for all 
claims so that different petitions must be filed. 
Any statute of limitations, especially one without a tolling 
provision, fails to appreciate the practical circumstances of litigants 
in habeas corpus cases. Virtually all such petitioners are in prison. 
Many are illiterate, ignorant, and confused . Some are retarded, mentally 
ill, insane, or physically incapacitated. Concepts of by-pass, 
forfeiture, waiver, and exhaustion, as well as the underlying substantive 
claims, are complicated ideas. For most petitioners, no lawyer or legal 
program is available. Although states do provide counsel for a direct 
i ntermediate appeal, counsel is not required for discretionary appeals or 
for state post-conviction procedures. Thus, the prisoner must prepare 
his case on his own or with whatever haphazard assistance he may obtain 
from a jailhouse lawyer. Prison law libraries are often lacking the 
basic volumes nece _ssary for minimal research, but even if law books are 
available, prisoner access to libraries is strictly controlled and 
limited by prison regulations. Legal documents and books are ;requently 
taken from pcisoners ducing searches of cells and "shakedowns" which can 
be done without any reason. Hudson v . Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984). 
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None of these circumstances would constitute unconstitutional state 
action under S. 238. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Often a 
prisoner's legal work is destroyed or stolen by other inmates. Finally, 
one of the most devastating effects of prison disturbances on inmates, 
whether participants or ·not, is the wholesale destruction of personal 
property, including legal papers, by inmates and guards. 
Additional problems continually affect inmates' opportunity to 
prepare legal papers for filing· in the federal courts. State court 
records, essential to prepare legally sufficient papers, are frequently 
not forwarded by state courts and prosecutors. Mail to and from persons 
outside the institution, with information relevant to the legal 
proceedings, may be censored or confiscated, in the interests of security. 
Finally, even after designation, a prisoner may be moved from prison 
to prison at the discretion of corrections officials. Olim v. 
Wakinekona, 103 S.Ct. 1741 (1983). An inmate may be removed from his 
designated prison on a writ issued by a prosecutor for a valid reason or 
merely to harass. Some prisoners, for reasons valid or not, may be 
compelled to spend time in administrative detention or segregation, with 
limited access to legal materials. 
In some instances petitions are not filed by district court clerks, 
but are returned to the prisoner because of procedural or formal defects 
or are accepted but not filed. These circumstances could result in 
failing to meet time deadlines. Suffice it to say that any statute of 
limitations in circumstances like these is intolerable and would 
constitute a denial of access to the courts. 
Particularly disturbing is the philosophy implicit in the statute of 
limitations proposal that a petitioner may be retained in custody if a 
new decision is rendered holding the statute under which he stands 
convicted to be unconstitutional but the prisoner fails to file a 
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petition within one year of the decision. For example, a statute may be 
held to violate the First or the Fifth Amendment (see Leary v. United 
States, 395 U.S . 6 (1969); United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d 633 (2d 
Cir. 1971)). In such situations, the petitioner has committed no crime 
and the state is unjustified in holding him in custody. Yet, if he does 
not file within one year of the decision, he must remain in custody. 
The constitutional issue raised by a statute of limitations is 
whether it violates the suspension clause. Art. I, S9, Cl.2 of the 
Constitution of the United States reads: "The privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or 
invasion of the public safety may require it." A statute of limitations 
constitutes a legislative/executive direction barring the courts from 
consideration of the constitutionality of custody after the limitation 
period has expired. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963); 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)(Black, J., dissenting); 
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963); United States v. 
Heyman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). As such, it is contrary to the 
Constitution. An argument has been made that no constitutional problem 
exists because federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners is 
of statutory origin and can be withdrawn by Congress. However, once 
Congress elects to provide a habeas corpus remedy for state prisoners, 
the constitutional provisions relating to habeas corpus apply and prevent 
suspension of the writ by a statute of limitations. 
In sum, a statute of limitations is unconstitutional as a suspension 
of the writ and, because of the unique condition of this category of 
litigants, as a denial of access to the courts. It is also unconsti-
tutional to the extent that it may permit custody of a person who has 
corranitted no crime. No evidence exists to demonstrate that delays in 
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• filing habeas corpus petitions are intentional or abusive of the 
process. In any event, in those cases where abuse or intent is clear, 
the matter may be resolved on an individual, case-by-case basis. 
4. Certificate for Appeal (Section 3 S2253) 
The bill permits a discretionary appeal on issuance of a certificate 
by a circuit judge. This proposal changes the present statute, which 
permits a certificate to be granted by a district judge or the circuit. 
The change is justified on the ground that it saves time and judicial 
resources. To the contrary, the requirement that the court of appeals, 
which knows nothing about the case, examine the entire record to 
determine whether an appeal should be taken will obviously take 
substantial time of that court. On the other hand, the district court, 
already familiar with the case, can make the decision to permit the 
appeal as part of the decision on the merits . 
Further, if the court of appeals grants a certificate judges of that 
court will examine a case two times: one for permission to appeal and 
again later for a decision on the merits. Although district court 
consideration of the case for the two purposes is by the same judge, 
different circuit judges are likely to consider the case in the two 
procedures. 
ll: ll: ll: 
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the American Bar Association, I would like 
to thank you and the Committee for inviting us to present these views. I 
would be pleased to answer any questions you or members of the Committee 
may have. 
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Honorable Strom Thurmond, Chairman 
Committee on the Judiciar y 
United States Senate 
hashingtor,, D.C. 205i0 
De2 r t-:r. Ch airman : 
We unterstanci that S.238, legislation which would 
seve rely li~it access to th e federal courts by means of 
haoe as corpus, ~i ll oe considered by the Judiciary 
Committee toDorro~. I am writing on behalf of the 
American Bar Association to urge your support for an 
amendment to be offered by Se nato rs Leahy and Mathias 
~hic h would retain a criticai aspect of current habeas 
procecures . 
In cestiffiony before the Judiciary Committee in 
October , we opposed S.2 38 as an overrea ction to perceived 
p r o u l e ::·, 3 1 r: c i..i r r e r: t ha be a s c o r p u s p r o c e du r es . L i m i ta t i on s 
on the ~rit proposed in S . 238 -- which virtually end all 
access to feoeral courts -- are unneces sary for two --
reasons : first, the li mited court time which is, in fact, 
consu~e~ by ha~eas petitions, and second , recent U.S. 
Suprece Court decisions which already limit access by 
state prisoners to fecieral courts. 
Of pa rtic ular concern to us are provisions in S.238 
~~i ch provioe that federal courts may not address any 
clain that has been "full y and fairly adjudicated" in 
state proceedings . Thi s provision is unsound. The Leahy 
and Mathias amendment would delete this provision. 
TGis provision is particularly dis turbing because it 
precludes consideration of whethe r the state decision is 
correct . Under this new standard , federal constitutional 
rights previously determinec by the Supreme Court and the 
u .S. Courts of Appeals may be violated with impunity. And 
because there will be no requirement of a uniform applica-
tion of feoerai constitution=l principles , constitutional 
righ:s ~ill undoubtedly vary from state to state -- giving 
ris~ to :fe possioil it y of 50 interpretations of federal 
c o ns:i~u:ion~~ provis i ons . 
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The ter~ "fully and fairly adjudicated• is not defined in 
tne bill. The coffi~ittee report states a federal court reviewing 
a habeas petition will examine the state decision to determine 
its "reasonableness" on issues of law, fact, and application of 
law to fact. But this is an inadequate standard to give 
meaningful guidance to the reviewing court. 
In striking the full and.fair adjudication requirement, the 
Leahy/Mathias amendDent would insure that the federal courts 
would reffioin the ultimate arbiters of constitutional and 
federal law, as they should be . It should be noted that writs 
of habeas corpus are grant ed in only a few cases. In the few 
cases in w~ich writs are granted, a person has been held in 
custody in violation of his constitutional rights; state courts 
have not corrected a violation of those rights; and the habeas 
petitio ner i s able to obtain relief only through the federal 
coLrts. Min1~izin9 the i~portance of decisions granting writs 
of habeas corpus cistorts the signif icance of important rights 
guaranteeu b~ ti1e Constitution, including the right to counsel 
and the right to a fair ana i~partial jury. 
Aithousi; acoption of t~is amendment would not cure other 
deficiencies in tte bill , it would remove an arbitrary obstacl e 
to ac~1eving justice in cri~inal aciJ udications. Consequentl y, 
we urge you to support the Leahy/Mathias amendment to delete 
tr.e "f~ll-anc-fair" section free S.238. 
~e also unci~rs~and that an amendment may be offered to 
incluoe tolling provisions in the one-year statute of 
li~itations provision contained in the bill. It is our 
understanding that, among other febtures , the amendment would 
provide that the one-year period would not expire (1) until a 
petitioner is personally notifi ed of the conclusion of state 
appellate proceedings , (2) in the abse nce of assistance of 
couns~l , or (3) where necessary to prevent manifest injustice. 
The ABA would strongly support su ch an amendment. · The ABA 
opposes a statute of limitations as contained in S.238 for 
habeas corpus provisions as an uncons titutional suspension of 
the ~rit . A statLte of limitations constitutes a 
legislative/executive directive barri ng the courts from 
considera tion of tr.t constitutionality of custody after the 
liffiitation has expired. As such we believe it is contrary to 
tne Constitution . 
r .. 
' 
• I J 
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Moreover, any statute of limitations, but especially one 
without built-in flexibility utilizing appropriate tolling 
provisions, fails to appreciate the practical circumstances of 
litigants in habeas cases. Most are illiterate prison inmates 
who must address complex legal and factual issues without 
assistance of counsel. A rigid statute of limitations as 
proposed in S.238 would deny many litigants access to the 
courts altogether. We therefore would support an amendment to 
prevent an arbitrary cut oft of this important provision. 
Sincerely, 
~~ . _~ 
Robert D. Evans 
i=:J:::/jE: 
Oc ..i. c_. 
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Honorable Patrick J . Leahy 
Committee on lhe Judiciary 
United States Senate 
Washington, DC 20510 
De ar Se na tor Leahy: 
February 4, 1986 
Le t me first thank you for the opportunity to appear before the 
Committee on the Judiciary on October 8, 1985 concerning S.238, 
habeas corpus legislation. I very much enjoyed that experience and 
th e American Bar Association appreciated the opportunity to discuss 
such an imporlanl area of the law. 
This letter is in response to a letter to the Committee dated 
November 20, 1985, from the Department of Justice. The November 20 
letter was prepared lo answer questions from you and Senator Biden 
contained in letters dated October 16 and October 23, 1985. 
I would like to respond specifically to several of the 
Depa rlme nl's answers which I believe are incorrect or misleading. 
On be half of th e ABA, I respectfully request that a copy of this 
l ette r be mad e part of the formal record of the committee's hearings 
o n S . 238. 
Qu e slion 1 1 a sks whether the tension between state and federal 
co url s c a u sed by habe as corpus review of state court decisions is 
nol s imil a r lo th e normal tensions between other branches of 
go ve rnm e nt. The Department of Justice responds that federal 
o ve rsi gh l of stat e s by way of habeas corpus is not comparable to the 
ch ec k s and balanc e s in the federal government because habeas corpus 
i s nol c ons titu t ionally authorized. The answer is unresponsive 
(al th ough we dis pu t e th e Department of Justice's view on the 
c onst ilu t i on a l basis for habeas corpus). The Supremacy Clause of 
t he Co ns titution, Art . VI, Cl . 2, establishes the supremacy of the 
Un ited Sl a t es Constitution, laws, and treaties, and specially 
d irecls th a t s tal e court judges are bound by United States law . The 
d ec l a r e d suprema cy of federal law has tcaditionally been the root of 
t e ns i on be twee n the slate and federal courts, as well as the state 
and f ederal go vernments. A current soucce of such tension are state 
c ou r l rul es pr ec luding attorneys from testifying before grand juries 
ab out th e sourc e of their clients' fees pursuant to Department of 
Ju s t ice subpo e ri as under federal law enforced in federal courts. 
Lik e o t he r "t e nsions" between branches of government and governments, 
th e t e ns i o n arising from federal court oversight in habeas corpus 
c ases has a pl a nne d constitutional basis . 
Th is i ssue , o f cours e , relates to th e Department of Justice's 
s l atemc ul on page 10 that "the views of f ede cal appella t e courts on 
,_ .~ CRll.~il~/...~ JU ST!C t~ 
iQ ()('I ,..., C;TO CC T tt\/1, 1 ..,~. Ir"'\ C'"• ,...\l'., n ,,., ... cu , ,, ,....T,...,,, 1 · '"'- ,..,..,,.... .., c cn~c·- ,...,,...,.., .., -. ......... .... ,.. • • ,.. . ·- - · ...... ~ ....... 
c-.a = 0 ::=>s;;;·. 
;;:. _ = ..;:-- -~:-
.;.:,.:. --:· ., :.s.:. ·::-. 
= :- ~= - :.:.·: 
Tai":"::. : c.._ :?~c:· 
~:-~.~~=_:~~::_·.-£_~ :· 
L' ·s/-'.\·,:·_'~;,·· ::, 
·:a- .., i:~. ~ : • . _ . . 
':: -.;;,:r - • - • -
\',·: £ .:- ..: ==-;::.-..:. 
J C,r. - ~: ':,· -:-:;:-: 
i t.5.:. "':'"" :: .:.=.:...: :-,. 
:_, S Cc .·· :· t.. ~ 
<:. r- ··- - a::.. 
~J::- :,. .. ;_:.: .. ·s-- -~---
q ,c .. :":"1(..:- : .·.c. ; ::.:: 
Sec:;:: ;s=-· 
::: -:!·.,: · : ; 
.:t;r.1. :..=-:. S: · 
2~(<:•· .:. :-: :.. . 
Ca.-~ =e •. · ·· 
.ess•s:--.:·. - 5~~ =- :;·.:..: 
_;-: E:-- = -::-- . 
--- - :.: -~ ~- -.:. . 
e1·· ··;· 
=: S·::·- : · -7 
5 ::·:-
s.::- :- · -: :- -
---C•·-~:- ·= -= 
-::: , ·. i-. = = -
:..: 5 .:: ~-
.: ---
M::-
• • O ! . - . 
5 '].:.= : := ::~-= -=-c -.;:· .:.; .:: : . 
= C : : ~-=·~·· ":":: 
... .,,·._ . - - ·. ·=·· ·= ~ -
:::-. . . ~ =.c- :--: 
,: ·-
· : : .. E:... =··· ·: 




._ -;-.,:' ;. - . 
._; _. __ 
:. - :· <:-: . 
..... ,-: · 
1 .. 
i ~/, ':'O ··; ·· -:-:--: ;: -
• , ! .._ Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 
Page Two 
February 4, 1986 
constitutional questions do not, of course, have any binding effect on state 
courts." We strongly dispute this proposition, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 
18-19 (1958). However, the continued adherence of the Department of Justice 
to this position only emphasizes the need for habeas corpus: if the states 
are free to ignore federal appellate courts as they render constitution-
al decisions, habeas corpus is essential to provide relief in particular 
cases, because the U.S. Supreme Court cannot be the sole monitor of the 
enforcement by the states of federal constitutional rights. It has been 
generally made known that the Supr~me Court's docket is heavy and that 
requests for the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction are consuming an enormous 
part of the Court's time. It is also known that the Supreme Court reviews on 
the merits only a small fraction of the cases in which appeal or certiorari is 
sought. Thus, to look to the Court's direct review power as the method to 
assure nationwide application of constitutional rights is not only unrealistic 
but misleading. 
Of course if, as the Department of Justice asserts, the important 
constitutional decisions come from the Supreme Court in the exercise of its 
direct review power, habeas corpus is absolutely essential for the 
determination of whether a decision is to be applied retroactively, and if 
retrospective application is appropriate, the application of the rule to cases 
tried prior to the Supreme Court's decision. 
Question 12 asks: "Isn't a statute of limitations without a tolling 
provision to protect against manifest injustice unconstitutional in that it 
might permit custody of a person who had committed no crime?" As shown by its 
response to that qu e stion and to Supplementary Question 2, the Department of 
Justice misund e r s t a nds Qu e stion 12, and its response is off the mark. The 
Justice Departmen t' s po sition is that newly discovered evidence showing 
innocenc e is an instance of manifest injustice and that it is remediable 
pursuant to Rule 33 , which has a limitation for filing . From this, the 
Departme nt con c lud es that a statute of limitations for habeas corpus need not 
includ e an exc ept i on f or manifest injustice. 
Howev e r, Qu es ti on 12 does not relate to whether there is new evidence of 
th e de fendant' s inn oce nc e of criminal conduct . Rather, it relates to other 
situation s. 
A judgme n t o f c onviction based on conduct in violation of a statute later 
held lo be inv a lid remains in effect unless a prisoner is provided with a 
reme dy for ch a ll e ng ing th e conviction . Continued detention of a person for 
condu ct th e l aw does no t consid e r criminal is manifestly unjust and no statut e 
of limitatio ns ba r to f ed e ral relief for such detention should be considered . 
For e xampl e , i n Uni t ed States v . Leary, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), the Supreme Court 
held th a t th e sta tu t or y inference of knowledge of illegal importation of 
marijuana fr om me r e po s s e ssion was impermissible. Proceedings pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §2255 were r equ ir e d to vacate the convictions of people who had been 
c o nvi cted und er th e i nv a li d statutory presumption prior to the Supreme Court's 
d e ci sio n . !::l.Luo r i v . United States, 314 F . Supp . 1184 (S.D . N. Y. 1969); United 
~_t_l!_!:_e_~ v . Val l e j Q, 312 F . Supp. 245 (S . D. N. Y. 1970); Perez v. United States, 
~ 
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315 F.Supp . 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Sorenson, 308 F.Supp. 1268 
(E.D.N . Y. 1970). 
Habeas corpus relief is necessary whenevec the Supreme Couct holds a 
statute invalid, as it recently did in Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S.Ct. 1855 
(1983), to vacate convictions rendered pursuant to the statute prioc to the 
Couct's decision. A statute of limitations barring relief to a pecson being 
punished foe conduct that is not criminal pecpetuates a manifest injustice, 
and may be unconstitutional as a vi~lation of due process. 
A statute of limitations that contains no exception perpetuates a manifest 
injustice in those cases in which the prosecutor has failed to produce at 
trial any evidence of guilt or in those cases in which the evidence fails to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Thompson v. Louisville, 362 
U.S. 199 (1960), and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), conviction and 
punishment in each of these circumstances constitutes a violation of due 
pcoccss, and a bac to habeas corpus may be unconstitutional. Bozeman v. 
Lambect, cited in the October 8, 1985, written testimony of Legal Defense 
Fund, and Hawkins v . Lefevre, 758 F.2d 866, 871 n.7 (2d Cic. 1985), ace cases 
with insufficient evidence. 
Finally, a statute of limitations with no exceptions foe manifest 
injustice would violate the Constitution if the claimed constitutional ercor 
wa s so secious as to place the reliability of the fact-finding ability of the 
jucy in doubt, thus making questionable the defendant's guilt. 
ln each of these situations (as well as in others) there is no new 
evidence, as the Depactment of Justice hypothesizes. The full record is 
available without new evidence and on its face it demonstrates the injustice 
of the conviction and the unfaicness of punishment. 
The Depactmcnt of Justice notes that there are time limits on filing 
notices of appeal foe dicect review, state prisonec applications for direct 
review in the Supcemc Couct, and Rule 33 motions for newly discovered 
evidence, and that a statute of limitations without tolling pcovisions is 
similacly appropciate foe filing habeas corpus petitions. In fact, the 
examples contcadict the Department's position. The 10-day period for filing a 
notice of appeal in a federal cciminal case may be extended under F.R.A.P. 
4(b). A pcoceeding pucsuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 may, under appropriate 
ciccumstances, result in a resentencing with the consequent ability to file a 
timely notice of appeal, and at sentencing the defendant will be advised of 
the eight to appeal by the couct, and will be repcesented by counsel. 
Ciccumstances are quite diffecent foe a prisonec who is in custody without 
counsel . 
Undec Supcemc Couct Rule 20 .l , the Couct can gcant an extension of time to 
file a petition foe a wcit of cectiocari in a cciminal case from a state couct 
of lasl cesoct, and lhc Court has held that ''an untimely petition can be 
entertained a11d gcanted and the case reviewed if thece ace compelling ceason s 
'" 
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for overlooking the untimeliness and for granting review.'' Robert L. Stern & 
Eugene Gressman, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 389 (5th ed. 1978). Further, even in 
federal cases involving newly discovered evidence, depending on the 
circumstances that caused the failure to discover the new evidence in time for 
trial, a §2255 proceeding may be an alternate remedy to Rule 33. 
In response to Question 9, the Department of Justice insists that, under 
S. 238, federal habeas corpus courts will review state court decisions for 
''reasonableness and consistency with due process.'' We can only restate the 
point made earlier that S. 238 does'not include reasonableness or consistency 
tests. Indeed, the Department of Justice has not mentioned a consistency test 
until now. If the statute is intended to mean that state court decisions 
should be consistent with Fourteenth Amendment standards, it must specifically 
say that, rather than permitting the opposite result. If that is what S. 238 
means, it is not necessary, for that is the law now. 
1 appreciate the opportunity to respond to these several facets of the 
Justice Department's November 20 letter and hope you will call on me and the 
Association if we can be of any assistance to you as consideration of this 
legislation progresses. 
PSB:dc 
cc: \lfu.bert D. Evans, Director 
ABA Washington Office 
Laurie Robinson, Director 
Sincerely, 
ABA Section of Criminal Justice 
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